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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Illinois Public Act 82-280, § 2-1706.5, as amended by P.A. 94-677, § 330 (eff. 
Aug. 25, 2005), and as codified as 735 ILCS 5/2-1706.5(a), imposes a $500,000 “cap” on 
the noneconomic damages that may be awarded in a medical malpractice suit against a 
physician or other health care professional, and a $1 million “cap” on the noneconomic 
damages that may be awarded against a hospital, its affiliates, or their employees. 
This brief will address two of the questions presented for review by the parties: 
1. Does the cap violate the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition on “special 
legislation,” Art. IV, § 3, because it unnecessarily, arbitrarily, and irrationally grants 
exceptional benefits and privileges exclusively to certain classes of tort defendants. 
2. Does the cap violate the Illinois Constitution’s guarantee of “equal 
protection,” Art. I, § 2, because it unnecessarily, arbitrarily, and irrationally imposes 
extraordinary burdens uniquely upon certain classes and sub-classes of tort plaintiffs. 
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Amici are 24 professors of law and social science who teach at universities in 
Illinois and throughout the United States. Amici submit this brief to provide this Court 
with an accurate, empirical account regarding the alleged existence, extent, and causes of 
a “health care crisis” in Illinois. Four of the amici—Neil Vidmar, Marc Galanter, Stephen 
Daniels, and Joanne Martin—filed affidavits in support of constitutional challenges to 
P.A. 89-7 (2005), and specifically 735 ILCS § 5/2-1115.1, the cap on noneconomic 
damages that this Court invalidated on “special legislation” and other grounds in Best v. 
Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). Those affidavits were neither challenged 
nor rebutted. Best noted that “the uncontested empirical evidence . . . presented in” those 
affidavits “clearly show[ed] that the legislative ‘findings’ listed in the [statute’s findings 
1 
and] preamble do not provide a rational justification for the limitation of compensatory 
damages for noneconomic injuries.” Id. at 386.1  
The arguments those four Best affiants and other amici advance in this brief are 
totally consistent with and derive from “the uncontested empirical evidence” that was 
submitted in Best. That evidence subsequently has been corroborated by additional 
research published in law reviews and peer review journals, much of which has been 
authored by several of the amici. The name of each amicus is listed below. Brief 
biographical sketches of all amici are contained in Appendix A. 
Neil Vidmar is Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law at Duke University 
School of Law and Professor of Psychology at Duke University. Tom Baker is Professor 
of Law at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. Ralph L. Brill is Professor of 
                                                 
1 As Best noted, Prof. Vidmar “explains that many of the assertions about medical 
malpractice litigation contained in the preamble of [P.A.] 89-7 . . . have no empirical 
basis and were based on unsubstantiated perceptions or unreliable data. For example, the 
perception that damages caps result in a decrease in the number of medical malpractice 
cases filed was rebutted by the experience in Indiana, [where] caps were adopted in 1975 
. . . [but] actually has experienced an increase in claims. Vidmar states that he is aware of 
no reliable evidence . . . that a limit on noneconomic damages corresponds to a 
significant impact on the cost or availability of health care.”179 Ill. 2d at 387. 
In a separate affidavit, Professor Galanter “agrees that there is little evidence, 
apart from anecdotes, to support the perceived deleterious effects of the present civil 
litigation system” and “that the only consequences which clearly flow from the passage 
of [P.A.] 89-7 are increased profitability of insurance companies and a reduction in the 
payments to the most seriously injured tort victims. According to Galanter, court filings 
in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County have actually declined during the 
period from 1980 to 1994” and “that arguments which rely on systemic costs of the civil 
litigation system and its negative effect on health care and jobs are purely speculative,” as 
are “the salutary effects attributed to [caps].” 179 Ill. 2d at 387-88. 
Finally, the joint affidavit of Professors Daniels and Martin “summarize the key 
empirical findings of scholarly literature and compare them to the factual underpinnings 
of [P.A.] 89-7.” They “state that the facts which form the stated intention or goals of 
[P.A.] 89-7 are not substantiated by the empirical data” which actually “show that only a 
tiny fraction of accidental deaths and injuries are pursued through the litigation system as 
claims for compensation” and “that jury awards are not erratic or capricious, but rather 
relate closely to the severity of the particular injury.” 179 Ill. 2d at 388.  
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INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Like clockwork, every seven to ten years the medical malpractice insurance 
industry goes through the “down” part of the periodic insurance business cycle and 
individual insurers attempt to boost sagging profits by raising the premiums they charge 
to physicians, hospitals, and other health-care providers. And just like clockwork, health-
care providers complain that the premium increases are so large as to be “unaffordable” 
and thus are causing a “health care crisis.” Finally, just like clockwork, physicians and 
their insurers seek legislative relief, claiming that the crisis has been caused by flaws in 
the civil justice system and insisting that the only way the flaws can be fixed—and the 
“crisis” cured—is by enacting a “cap” on damages or similar “reforms.” 
Thus, this case marks the fourth time in the last 33 years that this Court has been 
asked to assess the constitutionality of a statute that capped a tort plaintiff’s damages or 
otherwise limited a plaintiff’s cause of action. Each of the statutes at issue in the three 
prior cases was predicated on legislative findings that Illinois faced an imminent and 
severe “medical crisis” or “health care crisis” because malpractice claims supposedly 
were “skyrocketing” in number and malpractice awards ostensibly were “exploding” in 
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size, which allegedly compelled insurers to raise premiums to “unaffordable heights,” 
and thus putatively caused physicians to retire or flee the State. See Wright v. Central Du 
Page Hosp. Ass’n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 326 (1976) (invalidating cap on damages despite claim 
that it was “necessary to deal with . . . the ‘medical malpractice crisis’”); Bernier v. 
Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 229 (1986) (invalidating medical review panels despite a 
“malpractice crisis”); and Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 367 (invalidating cap notwithstanding 
legislative finding that the cap was needed to cure an “access[] to health care” crisis).  
In Wright, Bernier, and Best, the defendants and their amici assured the Court that 
there was ample evidence to sustain the legislature’s findings. And, in each case, the 
defendants and their amici warned the Court not to “second guess” the wisdom of the 
legislature and not to invalidate the statute, lest the Court revivify the “health care crisis” 
and reopen the wounds the legislature sagely had staunched.  
The arguments and factual averments made in defense of the instant statute 
essentially are no different and certainly no better than the ones advanced in previous 
cases. As before, the legislature found that rising malpractice premiums had caused a 
“health care crisis.” And, as before, the defendants in this case maintain that that finding 
is sound, the cap is needed, and invalidating the statute will have ruinous repercussions.  
As detailed below, these claims are unquestionably invalid. There is no doubt that 
when the cap was enacted in 2005 malpractice premiums were spiking in Illinois—just as 
they had peaked before the enactment of every previous tort “reform” in the State and, 
according to the American Medical Association, just as they were spiking simultaneously 
in 42 other states. Yet, there was and there is no credible evidence that Illinois was 
suffering from a health care crisis that was induced by a supposed “physician exodus” or 
5 
that the insurance crisis truly was caused by an alleged “torrent” of malpractice claims 
and an alleged “explosion” of “malpractice payouts.”  
First, as discussed in Section II-A, below, Illinois was not experiencing a “health 
care crisis” because of a “staggering” “exodus” of physicians. To the contrary, as 
discussed in Section II-A-1, empirical evidence from the most reliable sources—official 
statistics compiled by the American Medical Association (“AMA”) and the Illinois 
Department of Health—shows that the number of physicians licensed and engaged in 
“patient care” in Illinois has steadily increased for the last 45 years, both in net numbers 
and in relation to Illinois’ rising population. In fact, Illinois consistently has had a higher 
rate of “physicians per 100,000” residents—the critical measure of physician availability 
the AMA uses to compare one state to another and one period to another—than twelve of 
Illinois’ thirteen neighboring states, nine of which have caps on medical malpractice 
damages. (The sole state with a higher rate of physicians/100,000, i.e., more doctors per 
capita, is Minnesota, which does not have, and never has had, a cap). Illinois also has 
more doctors per capita than three other states—California, Ohio, and Texas—that the 
defendants and their amici tout as being non-crisis exemplars of health care availability 
because those states have caps on the books. In sum, contrary to the claims of the 
defendants and their amici, over five decades, physicians consistently have been flocking 
to Illinois, not fleeing from it. These data are depicted in the following GRAPH No.1, 
which is based on CHART 1, both of which are attached in Appendix B. (All of the eight 
charts and graphs created for this brief are attached in Appendix B).  
6 
GRAPH No. 1: 
Rate of All Licensed Physicians Per 100,000 People—Illinois vs. 
13 Bordering and Neighboring States: 1963-2005
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Furthermore, as discussed in Section II-A-2, data from the AMA and the Illinois 
Department of Health demonstrate that both the net number and per capita rate of 
licensed and patient care physicians who practiced in critical medical specialties (such 
as neurosurgeons and obstetricians/gynecologists (“OB/GYNs”)), constantly were 
increasing. Finally, as discussed in Section II-A-3, licensed and patient care physicians 
practicing in the 51 counties in the largely rural half of the State “south of Springfield” 
steadily has increased, both in net numbers and in proportion to the region’s population. 
 Second, as discussed in Section II-B, one of the key reasons why physicians have 
not abandoned Illinois, rural areas, or medical specialties despite rising premiums, is that 
although premiums have spiked, the increases have not made insurance “unaffordable.” 
Indeed, research shows that malpractice premiums are a comparatively small and 
historically declining portion of gross practice revenues and net practice income. 
Another reason why doctors have not fled Illinois is that the latest insurance crisis, like 
the crises that preceded the reforms struck down in Wright, Bernier, and Best, occurred 
simultaneously throughout the country. This fact not only suggests that the crisis was not 
caused by factors unique to each state but explains why few physicians would flee from 
one state to another, from an alleged “frying pan” into an unknown “fire.” 
Finally, as discussed in Section II-C, credible empirical evidence, much of which 
has been undertaken and published by the amici herein, contradicts the notions that the 
insurance crisis was caused by flaws in the civil justice system, i.e., by an alleged 
“torrent” of malpractice claims and a supposed “explosion” of “malpractice payouts.” In 
fact, malpractice claims were falling in absolute number, falling in relation to the number 
of physicians in the State, and falling in proportion to the population. At the same time, 
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post-verdict “payouts” were rising in only modest amounts, on a par with increasing 
longevity and medical inflation. 
ARGUMENT 
The Illinois Constitution’s guarantee of “equal protection,” Art. I, § 2, bars the 
State from unreasonably treating some people worse than others who are similarly 
situated. The Constitution’s proscription against “special legislation,” Art. IV, § 3, bars 
the legislature from arbitrarily treating some classes better than similarly situated classes 
Viewed together, these precepts forbid the legislature from irrationally imposing unequal 
burdens on some groups and groundlessly bestowing special benefits, privileges, or 
immunities upon others. 
I. THE CAP CREATES NEW AND ARBITRARY DIVISIONS AMONG TORT VICTIMS, 
WHICH ARE MIRRORED BY ARBITRARY DIVISIONS AMONG TORTFEASORS 
Best held that a cap on noneconomic damages in tort cases “discriminates” 
between and among tort plaintiffs and tort defendants in at least three ways.  
First, caps discriminate among plaintiffs and tortfeasors based on the 
severity of the injuries. A cap “discriminates between slightly and severely injured 
plaintiffs;” although slightly injured individuals receive the “full amount of fairly 
assessed compensatory damages,” a cap deprives the most profoundly injured plaintiffs 
of much of the damages that the factfinder already has determined is reasonably justified 
by the evidence. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 403. This is perverse, as those who suffer minor 
injuries receive their full measure of damages but those who are severely injured do not. 
Indeed, the more catastrophic the injury the greater the cap strips away the share of the 
victim’s recovery and the smaller the fraction of noneconomic damages a victim will 
receive. Id. Conversely, a cap “discriminate[s] . . . between tortfeasors who cause severe 
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and moderate or minor injuries,” capriciously allowing wrongdoers who cause the 
greatest harm to pay only partial damages, while compelling those who cause slight 
injuries to pay in full. Id.  
Second, caps discriminate between individuals with similar injuries based on 
the type of tortfeasor. A cap discriminates “between injured individuals who suffer 
identical injuries,” with the application of the cap depending on whether the cap shields a 
particular tortfeasor in a particular case. Id. The cap in dispute in this case discriminates 
between malpractice plaintiffs (whose damages are capped) and all other tort plaintiffs 
(whose damages are not), even if different plaintiffs suffer the exact same injuries. 
Conversely, the cap discriminates between malpractice defendants (who receive a special 
and substantial immunity from noneconomic damages above $500,000) and all other tort 
defendants (who receive no such legislative largesse). Id.  
Third, caps discriminate among types of injuries. A cap “discriminates among 
types of injuries” because “the supposed difficulties of assessing damages for 
noneconomic injuries apply equally to all tort claims for pure noneconomic loss, and not 
just those involving death, bodily injury or property damage,” id. at 404, or just injuries 
caused solely by malpractice. 
Numerous courts in other states, before and since Best, have echoed this Court’s 
views on the ways a cap discriminates and accordingly have struck down caps on special 
legislation or equal protection grounds.2 
                                                 
2 E.g., Ferdon v. Wisc. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 465 (Wisc. 2005); 
State ex. rel. OATL v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999); Trujillo v. City of 
Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 305, 317 (N.M. 1998); Hanvey v. Oconee Mem. Hosp., 416 
S.E.2d 623, 625-26 (S.C. 1992); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ohio 1991); 
Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236-37 (N.H. 1991); Moore v. Mobile Infirm. 
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Furthermore, caps disproportionately affect traditionally disadvantaged 
groups. Empirical research by neutral, well-regarded scholars not only corroborates 
Best’s insights but clearly establishes that a cap discriminates—against some tort 
plaintiffs and in favor of some tortfeasors—in several other ways besides the one 
described in Best. This objective research demonstrates that a cap disproportionately 
affects traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as women, children, people of color, the 
elderly, and people of low income in general, reducing the damages such people receive 
because their economic damages, such as lost wages, either are nonexistent or 
disproportionately low, e.g., juries award such victims a greater proportion of their 
overall compensatory damages in the form of noneconomic damages. 
For example, empirical research shows that a cap on noneconomic damages 
exacerbates existing gender-based disparities in the tort system. Lucinda M. Finley, 
The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1263 (2004). This is so because, overall, jury awards to men tend to be higher than 
women, due in part to men’s higher wage-based economic damages. Id. at 1280-81. Thus, 
because a cap operates to deprive women of a greater portion of an overall award, it 
effectively exacerbates the disparity between the average amounts that injured men 
recover compared to the amounts that women recover. Id. at 1282-85, 1288-99.3 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 169 (Ala. 1991); Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 353 
(Utah 1989); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 715-23 (Wash. 1989); Lucas v. 
United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tex. 1988); Sibley v. Bd. of Super. of La. State 
Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108-09 (La. 1985); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133, 
135-36 (N.D. 1978). 
3 Professor Finley found that although “women’s pre-cap median jury award was 
94% of the men’s median,” post-cap “women’s median was down to 58.6% of the male 
median.” 53 EMORY L.J. at 1286. Even greater gender disparities were found when 
malpractice causes death; post-cap, the female median recovery was only 71.3% of the 
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 By like token, caps disproportionately disadvantage children and the elderly. 
Because the elderly (age sixty-five or older) often live on fixed and limited incomes, 
while children generally do not have income of any substantial kind, and because juries 
also award elderly and minor plaintiffs a much greater portion of their overall damage 
awards as noneconomic damages compared to other plaintiffs, caps effectively 
discriminate against these claimants. Finley, 53 EMORY L.J. at 1286-88 & 1302-04. For 
example, elderly plaintiffs, whose working days are behind them, do not incur the same 
extent of past or future wage loss as non-elderly plaintiffs. Moreover, given their shorter 
life expectancy, elderly plaintiffs will not incur as many years of projected future medical 
expenses. Despite these reduced areas of economic loss, elderly tort victims still suffer 
debilitating pain and reduced life activities. Id. at 1288-91. Noneconomic damages 
                                                                                                                                                 
male median, and women’s average recovery was 51.7% of the average male. Id. at 1291. 
Finley further noted: “[s]everal types of injuries that are disproportionately suffered by 
women—sexual assault, reproductive harm, such as pregnancy loss or infertility, and 
gynecological medical malpractice—do not affect women in primarily economic terms. 
Rather, the impact is felt more in the ways compensated through noneconomic loss 
damages: emotional distress and grief, altered sense of self and social adjustment, 
impaired relationships, or impaired physical capacities, such as reproduction, that are not 
directly involved in market based wage earning activity. Many of these most precious, 
indeed priceless, aspects of human life are virtually worthless in the market, and there is 
social resistance to seeing them solely or primarily in commodified, market-based terms.” 
Id. at 1281. See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in 
Civil Courts, Classrooms, and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55 (2006). See also 
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 114 (2001); Martha 
Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
463, 467, 499-502, 519-21, 528-30 (1998); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and 
Her Tort Reform, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 84-85 (1995).  
 In general, Harvard School of Public Health researchers who studied California 
jury verdicts to assess the impact of that state’s $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages 
found “the burden of caps falls on injuries that cause chronic pain and disfigurement but 
do not lead to declines in physical functioning that would generate lost work time or high 
health care costs. . . . Notwithstanding their limited economic impact, the injuries 
involved are by no means trivial.” David Studdert, et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? 
A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 54, 63 (2004). 
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become the principal way for the jury to assess and provide compensation for the severity 
and life-altering effects of the injury.4 
A cap’s disparate impact on youth is also glaringly evident. The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court recently observed that “[y]oung people are most affected by [a cap] . . . 
because many can expect to be affected by their injuries over a sixty-or seventy-year life 
expectancy.” Ferdon, supra, 701 N.W.2d at 466. Lastly, Professor Finley also found 
“[t]he impact of the cap in cases where an infant or child died as a result of malpractice 
was even more draconian than in the adult death cases,” as their families endure a 79 
percent reduction in the median award. 53 EMORY L.J. at 1293.  
Finally, caps effectively discriminate against members of racial and national 
minorities, who are disproportionately unemployed and disproportionately employed in 
the lowest-paying occupations. See Amanda A. Edwards, Medical Malpractice Non-
Economic Damages Caps: Recent Developments, 43 HARV. J. LEGIS. 213, 219-21 (2006) 
(examining how such caps affect minority populations, and explaining how the data 
tables used to calculate economic damages project lower earnings for non-white workers, 
and this results in lower economic damages and more harm from non-economic damage 
                                                 
4 Finley reported that, on average, noneconomic damages for elderly female 
patients in malpractice cases that did not result in death were reduced an average of 
31.7% by a $250,000 cap. 53 EMORY L.J. at 1289. The median recovery for elderly 
women after application of the cap was 53.7% of the pre-capped amount; the recovery for 
elderly men was 72.8% of the pre-cap median. Id. See also Michael L. Rustad, 
Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Meritorious 
Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331 (2006). Empirical research also shows that 
when the gender of plaintiff is combined with the age of plaintiff, juries tend to award 
women an even greater proportion of their total compensatory award as noneconomic 
damages than elderly men. Finley, 53 EMORY L.J. at 1291. In addition, if an elderly 
plaintiff dies, juries allocate a substantial majority of the damages to noneconomic 
damages. Id. Thus, caps have an especially disparate impact on elderly women. Id. 
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caps); Joanne Doroshow & Amy Widman, The Racial Implications of Tort Reform, 25 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 161, 169-70 & fn. 37-38 (2007).5 
In sum, caps discriminate against people of low income. For plaintiffs with low 
or nonexistent economic damages, caps on noneconomic damages constitute a form of 
discrimination that limits total compensation for similar injuries merely because of the 
plaintiff’s age, gender, race, status, or wealth. Finley, 53 EMORY L.J. at 1292-93 & 1313. 
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link 
Between Damage Caps and Access, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 644-46, 648-55, & 669 
(2006). 
In light of Best’s precedential determinations that caps discriminate in three 
fundamental ways and in light of the foregoing demonstration that caps discriminate in 
several other ways, the critical question for this Court is whether the legislature acted 
reasonably in enacting the instant cap, i.e., was the cap truly needed to fix an alleged 
“health care crisis.” See Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003) (a statute 
must “bear a rational relationship to the public interest sought to be served”). Amici show, 
based on the empirical evidence discussed in detail below, that the cap was wholly 
unnecessary and that it is thus violates both the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection and the Constitution’s proscription against special legislation. 
                                                 
5 See generally Myron Orfield, Segregation and Environmental Justice, 7 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 147, 151 (2005); A.J. Schultz, et al., Racial and Spatial Relations as 
Fundamental Determinants of Health, 80 MILBANK Q. 677, 683 (2002); Michael Rustad, 
Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attach on Women, Blue Collar Workers, and 
Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 734 (1996); Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 
UCLA L. Rev. 785, 798-802 (1990); Andrew Hacker, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, 
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 115-17 (2003). 
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II. THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR THE INSTANT CAP 
In 2005, the General Assembly found that a cap was needed because “[t]he 
increasing cost of medical liability insurance in Illinois” had caused a “health care crisis” 
throughout the State. P.A. 94-677, Art. 1, § 101. As detailed below, the defendants and 
their amici insist that this finding was justified and that the cap must be upheld on 
rational basis grounds because of three interrelated and allegedly indisputable facts: 
(1) “staggering” numbers of Illinois physicians allegedly were retiring 
early or “fleeing” from: (a) the State; (b) high-risk medical specialties such as 
neurosurgery or obstetrics/gynecology; and (c) rural areas of the State; 
(2) the physician “exodus” was caused because physicians allegedly 
could not afford to pay rising malpractice premiums; and  
(3) malpractice premiums were rising because of alleged flaws in the 
civil justice system, i.e., an escalating “torrent” of malpractice claims and an “explosion 
in the size of payouts.” 
Neither the legislature’s finding, nor the efforts by the defendants’ and their amici 
to substantiate that finding, are supported by any empirical studies or other credible 
research. To the contrary, the claims that Illinois was suffering from a “health care 
crisis”—and that the civil justice system was to blame—were debunked at the time by 
empirical studies authored by government agencies and neutral scholars. Subsequent 
research, as summarized in this brief, confirmed the earlier studies. For these reasons, 
neither the legislature’s skeletal finding nor the defendants’ strained attempts to validate 
that finding justify the cap’s enactment. In light of these facts this Court is not required to 
uphold a statute that, as noted above, burdens so many groups in so many ways while 
providing mirror-image special privileges and immunities to so many other groups. 
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A.  The Physician “Exodus” Is a Myth, as Illinois Has Never Suffered a 
Decline in the Number of Physicians in the State, in Rural Areas, or 
Among Critical Medical Specialists, Either in Net Numbers or the 
Critical Ratio of Physicians per Capita  
1. The supply of licensed physicians throughout Illinois steadily 
has increased over the last 45 years, both in net numbers and in 
relation to the Illinois population 
The defendants and their amici insist that the $500,000 “cap” on noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases is a necessary and rational solution to “‘the health 
care crisis,’” a crisis caused by the “early retirement” of an unspecified number of 
physicians, Gottlieb Mem. Hosp. Br. at 44, or the “flight from Illinois” of an unspecified 
number of other doctors. Levi-D’Ancona Br. at 8. According to two of the defendants’ 
amici, the Illinois State Medical Society (“ISMS”) and the American Medical 
Association (“AMA”), rising malpractice premiums caused nothing less than a 
“staggering”—but again, unspecified—“exodus” of physicians from Illinois during an 
unspecified period before the cap was enacted in 2005. ISMS/AMA Br. at 13. Finally, the 
ISMS and AMA warn the Court that blood will be on its hands unless it upholds the 
constitutionality of the cap, as “[a]ny decision to overturn such a rational Public Act 
would unnecessarily undo two years of successful reform—which has provided expanded 
access to health care services and greater availability of life saving care.” Id. at 9. See 
also Levi-D’Ancona Br. at 12. 
This threat is hollow and these allegations are false. First, the allegations are not 
supported by any reliable empirical data or by analyses published in any reputable 
journal. To the contrary, each claim is bottomed on either anecdotal “horror stories” or 
unverified surveys by doctors’ organizations and insurance companies—sources of 
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information that numerous courts and neutral researchers have castigated as unreliable.6 
The ISMS and the AMA rely upon “Illinois and other newspapers [which] contained 
many examples of physicians relocating outside of Illinois.” ISMS/AMA Br. at 12. See 
id. at 12-13 (citing Dorothy Schneider, State Legislators Look to Limit Doctors’ Rising 
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, STATE J.-REG., Jan. 15, 2004, at 19, for the proposition 
that “the aggregate number of physicians lost from Illinois is staggering.” (Emphasis 
added)). If the “aggregate number” is truly “staggering,” the ISMS and the AMA—which 
have ready access to data about the number of physicians annually licensed and 
practicing in Illinois—could have and should have provided that “number.”  
Tellingly, they do not. 
                                                 
6 Both kinds of “evidence” of a physicians’ “exodus”—anecdotal horror stories 
and self-serving surveys—have been condemned as completely untrustworthy by 
numerous courts and objective scholars. For example, federal government researchers 
who have studied anecdotal accounts of physicians fleeing from one state or another and 
examined survey designs and results regarding physicians’ future plans have found such 
reports and surveys to be unreliable. For example, “‘very few physicians tend to respond 
to these surveys, raising doubt about how accurately their responses reflect the practices 
of all [health care providers]. [The results] cannot be generalized more broadly [beyond 
anecdotal evidence].’” Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 488 (quoting U.S. General Accounting 
Office, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care, 
GAO-03-836 (Aug. 2003) at 6 http:www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf.). Furthermore, 
federal researchers also found that newspaper reports and legislative testimony that 
physicians had retired or would move their practices to another state often were false or 
unsubstantiated. See GAO, Medical Malpractice: Implications at 5-7, 13-14, 17-20, & 
28. More recent research by Professor Michelle Mello regarding Pennsylvania, where 
medical society surveys reported that doctors were planning to flee the state in droves, 
found that such alarms were false and that such surveys, “including [her] own,” were 
neither accurate nor reliable. Michelle Mello, et al., Changes in Physician Supply and 
Scope of Practice During a Malpractice Crisis: Evidence from Pennsylvania, 26 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 425, 433 (2007). (“Previous survey work ha[d] elicited information about 
specialists’ intentions to restrict their scope of practice, but . . . [o]ur analysis found more 
modest effects of the liability crisis on physician supply than have been suggested by 
physician survey studies, including our own.”). 
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Second, the reason why the defendants and their amici do not cite any credible 
data or studies to buttress their claims is obvious: because no such data or studies exist. In 
fact, their claims are completely contradicted by research published in the most widely 
used and respected source of such data: the AMA’s own authoritative annual 
compendium, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S. (“PC&D”).7 
Indeed, as shown by GRAPH 1 and CHART 1 (see Appendix B), AMA data over 
the last 45 years makes five things abundantly clear:  
  a.  The net number of licensed physicians in Illinois 
consistently has increased over the last five decades. The net number of licensed 
physicians in Illinois, i.e., the number of physicians licensed in the State, minus the 
physicians who died, retired, or moved out of state, plus the physicians who started 
practices in or moved to the State, grew constantly from 1963 (the earliest year for which 
comprehensive data was publicly available from the AMA) to 2005 (the year the cap was 
enacted). Indeed, the net number nearly tripled in size, from 13,835 in 1963 to 38,513 in 
2005.8 During this 45-year span, the net number of licensed physicians never declined in 
Illinois. Significantly, this unbroken string covers both the “crisis” periods that preceded 
enactment of the caps and other “reforms” struck down in Wright, Bernier, and Best, and 
                                                 
7 The AMA describes the PC&D as “the most accurate and complete source for 
statistical data about Doctors of Medicine . . . supply in the United States.” AMA Press 
Online Catalog, https://catalog.ama-assn.org (last visited Aug. 12, 2008). PC&Ds are 
routinely relied upon by courts and scholars. See, e.g., FormyDuval v. Bunn, 530 S.E.2d 
96, 101 (N.C. App. 2000); Torres Vargas v. Santiago Cummings, 149 F.3d 29, 35 (1st 
Cir. 1998); Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for 
Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71, 83 n.89 (2008); 
Lawrence P. Casolino, Physicians and Corporations: a Corporate Transformation of 
American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 869, 881 (2004). 
8 Compare AMA, PC&D (1967 ed.), Tbl. 8, with PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 5.17. 
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the periods after those decisions were rendered, i.e., the years in which the defendants in 
those cases had prophesized that doctors would flee unless the caps were upheld.  
The fact that the net number of licensed physicians was increasing, not 
decreasing, was hardly a secret. Before the present cap was enacted, Crain’s Chicago 
Business, among several other Illinois papers, published numerous reports noting that 
although “[t]ales of doctors fleeing Illinois to escape soaring malpractice insurance costs 
have captured media attention and fueled the push for limits on jury awards, . . . the 
numbers tell a different story.” Bob Tita, More Docs in Illinois, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., 
July 5, 2004 (emphasis added). 
Overall, the number of doctors in Illinois is rising, according to data from 
the state agency that licenses physicians. . . . Some 39,950 doctors were 
licensed to practice in Illinois as of May 31, [2004] up 5.3% from a year 
earlier, according to figures from the Illinois Department of Professional 
Regulation. . . . The agency’s numbers for 2003 reflect the most recent 
renewal year, and show 37,925 doctors licensed in Illinois. That’s a 5.2% 
rise over 2000, the last renewal figures, and a 22.6% increase since 1994.  
Id. A year later, Crain’s reported  
[t]he number of doctors licensed in Illinois rose 9% in the last three years, 
despite assertions that physicians are fleeing to neighboring states with 
lower malpractice insurance rates, . . . counter[ing] claims that doctors 
are leaving the state in droves . . . . “We’re not seeing an unstable market 
for docs in Illinois,” says Susan Hofer, a spokeswoman for the Illinois 
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. 
Brett Chase, Caps or No, Illinois Adds to Doc Totals, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Sept. 12, 
2005 (emphasis added). 
  b.  The relative number of licensed physicians in Illinois, 
i.e., compared to Illinois’ population, also has consistently increased over the last 
five decades, including the decade before the cap’s enactment. More important than 
net numbers, the relative number of licensed physicians in the State—relative to Illinois’ 
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population—also has grown steadily over the last five decades.9 As a result, the critical 
“physician/population ratio,” i.e., the rate of licensed physicians per capita, has increased 
in Illinois, year after year, for more than forty years, rising from 134 physicians per 
100,000 persons in 1963 to 302 physicians per 100,000 persons in 2005. This means that 
the number of licensed physicians in Illinois has grown more than twice as fast as the 
State’s population. The steadiness of this increase—before, during, and after all four of 
Illinois’ malpractice insurance “crises”—also is reflected in CHART 1 and GRAPH 1. 
Once again, the number of physicians per capita grew during the most recent “crisis” (the 
five years before the most recent cap was enacted), just as the number of physicians per 
capita grew during the previous “crisis” periods and, in spite of various defendants’ dire 
warnings, actually grew after this Court invalidated the previous caps. 
  c.  Illinois has, and consistently has had, more physicians 
per capita than twelve of its thirteen neighbors. As also reflected in CHART 1 and 
GRAPHS 1 and 2 (see Appendix B), Illinois’ licensed physician-to-population ratio 
consistently has outpaced the same ratio for twelve of Illinois’ thirteen neighbors, 
including nine states that have had malpractice caps on the books for years, if not 
decades.10 The sole exception is Minnesota, whose rate of physicians per 100,000 has 
                                                 
9 A superficial glance at CHART 1 and GRAPH 1 reveals slight downturns in the 
rate of physicians per 100,000 in Illinois, and nearly every other state, on a periodic basis, 
e.g., for the year 2000. This does not reflect a real downturn in the rate but rather is an 
artifact of the AMA’s unexplained decision to vary the type of physicians counted from 
year to year, such as from only “non-federal” physicians in the PC&Ds’ 1997-2002 and 
2003-2004 editions (covering 1996-99 and 2001-02), to adding “federal” physicians to 
the mix in the 2005-2008 editions (covering 1990, 1995, 2000, & 2003-05). Similarly, the 
AMA often, but not always, varies the population measured, from only the “civilian 
population” to the “civilian population and military personnel in the U.S.” 
10 The nine neighboring states with caps on damages in malpractice cases are 
Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-14-3); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-19a02, 60-
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exceeded Illinois’ rate for forty of the last forty-five years, including since 2000. 
Significantly, however, Minnesota does not have, and never has had, a cap on damages. 
  d.  Illinois has, and consistently has had, more physicians 
per capita than the three cap states touted as exemplars by the defendants and their 
amici. As reflected in CHART 2 and GRAPH 2 (see Appendix B), the rate of licensed 
physicians per 100,000 in Illinois has, since 2000, consistently exceeded the comparable 
rate in California, despite the fact that California’s 1975 medical malpractice reform 
statute, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act—which served as a model for the 
latest Illinois cap—was supposed to be a panacea for all that ailed the medical 
community. Illinois’s physician/population ratio has, since 1963, consistently exceeded 
the comparable rates for Texas and Ohio, notwithstanding the fact that those cap states 
also supposedly are much more “physician-friendly.” Levi-D’Ancona Br. at 13. See 
ISMS/AMA Br. at 11. Indeed, in 2005, only fifteen states in the country had a higher rate 
of licensed physicians per 100,000 than Illinois—namely, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. See AMA, PC&D 
(2007 ed.), Tbl. 5.19. And only three of those fifteen states have caps: Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and Virginia. 
  e.  The net number and rate of practicing, “patient care” 
physicians steadily has increased in Illinois. Finally, the same upward trends—showing 
                                                                                                                                                 
1903(a)); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.1483(1)); Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
538.210); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2825); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 32-
42-02); Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2323.43); South Dakota (S.D. Codified Laws § 21-
3-11); and Wisconsin (Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 655.017). Four of Illinois’ thirteen neighbors do 
not have caps: Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Tennessee. 
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the opposite of a physician “exodus” and the opposite of a “health care crisis” in 
Illinois—are evident when measured by the sub-set of licensed physicians who are 
engaged in what the AMA describes as “patient care” (including both “office based” and 
“hospital based” practitioners) as distinct from those licensed physicians engaged in 
“other,” non-patient care “professional activit[ies],” such as medical “research,” 
“teaching,” or “administration,” or who self-report themselves as being retired. See 
AMA, PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 3.7. Comprehensive AMA data regarding this criterion 
was first published in the 1994 edition of the PC&D (covering the 1993 period). (See 
Appendix B, CHART 3). The hard empirical data show that the net number of physicians 
engaged in “patient care” in Illinois steadily increased from 1993 to 2005: from 24,515 in 
1993 to 31,172 in 2005. Thus the data reflect an actual 27.15 percent jump in the number 
of physicians who treat patients. The relative number of Illinois physicians, i.e., per 
capita, engaged in patient care increased 16.54 percent during the same twelve-year 
period, from 209.58 physicians per 100,000 in 1993 to 244.24 physician per 100,000 in 
2005. (See Appendix B, CHART 3 and GRAPH 3). 
In summary, there is no truth at all to the claim that Illinois suffered “doctor 
flight,” as the Defendants and their amici assert. Doctors, like other human beings, move, 
switch professions or specialties, retire, and die. But however many physicians may have 
left the State, their practices, or this mortal coil, their numbers were exceeded, year-in 
and year-out, by new doctors beginning their practices in the State or experienced 
physicians moving their practices to the State. The doctor “exodus” is a complete canard.  
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2. Contrary to the allegations of the defendants’ amici, the net 
number and per capita rate of “‘high-risk’ medical specialists” 
was rising—not falling—in Illinois 
Three of the defendants’ amicus briefs maintain that even if the net number of all 
licensed physicians has not fallen in Illinois, “‘high risk’ medical specialties—such as 
orthopedics, neurosurgery, obstetrics-gynecology, and general surgery—were particularly 
hard hit by massive spikes in the cost of liability coverage,” Ill. Hosp. Ass’n Br. at 10, 
which supposedly led to severe but unenumerated “staffing shortages” in these 
specialties. Health & Hosp. Corp. Br. at 7. See AMA Br. at 12.  
There is no truth to these claims, either. 
Although AMA data regarding physician specialization in Illinois prior to 1990 is 
unavailable and although post-1990 data is available only for certain years, according to 
the AMA data that is available, the net number of licensed Illinois physicians who 
specialized in “orthopedics, neurosurgery, [and] obstetrics-gynecology” consistently 
increased, from 2,462 in 1990 to 3,037 in 2005. (See Appendix B, CHART 4). More 
important, as also reflected in CHART 4 and GRAPH 4, the per capita rate of Illinois 
physicians who specialized in “orthopedics, neurosurgery, [and] obstetrics-gynecology” 
grew during that period from 21.54 per 100,000 in 1990 to 23.79 per 100,000 in 2005. 
Significantly, changing the focus from all licensed physicians to just “patient 
care” physicians does not change the picture. Thus, as also shown in CHART 4 and 
GRAPH 4, the net number of patient care neurosurgeons, orthopedic surgeons, and 
OB/GYNs in Illinois rose from 2,396 in 1990 to 2,957 in 2005, while the per capita rate 
of patient care physicians in these three specialties steadily increased from 20.96 per 
100,000 in 1990 to 23.17 per 100,000 in 2005.  
23 
Once again, the fact that the number of OB/GYNs and neurosurgeons was 
increasing, not decreasing, was no secret to anyone who read Crain’s, the state’s leading 
business journal, which reported: “data likewise fail to support the medical lobby’s 
claims that Illinois is losing doctors in those specialties. An analysis by the American 
Board of Medical Specialties shows Illinois registered 3% more neurosurgeons and 2% 
more OB/GYNs [just] in the past year.” Brett Chase, Caps or No, Illinois Adds to Doc 
Totals, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., Sept. 12, 2005 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, consistent with Crain’s research, a study published earlier this year in 
the peer-reviewed Journal of Empirical Legal Studies reported the results of a 
longitudinal research design assessing state-year-level data on the supply of OB/GYNs in 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia between 1992 and 2002. Tony Yang, et al., A 
Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Liability Pressure on the Supply of Obstetrician-
Gynecologists, 5 J. EMPIRICAL  LEGAL STUDIES 21 (2008). Yang and his fellow 
researchers found that the supply of OB/GYNs had no statistically significant association 
with liability insurance premiums or tort reforms. The authors concluded:  
Although the costs of malpractice insurance are substantial for OB/GYNs, 
they do not appear to be significantly associated with the supply of 
physicians in a state. Most practitioners in this specialty do not respond to 
liability risk by relocation or discontinuing their practice. 
Yang, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES at 53 (emphasis added). 
To be sure, as portrayed in CHART 4, the net number of licensed and patient care 
general surgeons declined during the same period, from 1,681 and 1,619, respectively, in 
1990 to 1,553 and 1,501, respectively, in 2005. The relative number (rate of physicians 
per capita) of licensed and patient care general surgeons fell even more, from 14.21 and 
13.69, respectively, per 100,000 in 1990 to 12.17 and 11.76, respectively, per 100,000 in 
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2005. Yet, this decline in the net numbers and relative rates of general surgeons began 
long before the start of the latest insurance “crisis” and reflects long-term trends towards 
surgical sub-specialization throughout the country. Thus, historically, the number of 
general surgeons has declined, throughout the nation: (a) in net numbers; (b) as a 
percentage of all physicians; and (c) in relationship to the country’s population. i.e., in the 
rate of general surgeons per 100,000 persons. 
(a) The net number of licensed general surgeons in the nation 
declined, from 38,376 in 1990 to only 37,857 general surgeons in 2005. Compare AMA, 
PC&D (1992 ed.) Tbl. 1; PC&D (2007 ed.) Tbl. 1.2.  
(b) The fall-off in the net number of general surgeons occurred while 
the overall net number of physicians increased by nearly 50 percent, from 615,421 
licensed physicians in the nation in 1990 to 902,053 physicians in 2005. Thus, while 
general surgeons comprised 6.36 percent of all physicians nationwide in 1990, they made 
up only 4.2 percent of all physicians in 2005. Compare AMA, PC&D (1992 ed.), Tbl. 1; 
PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 1.2.  
(c)  Put another way, while there were 15.43 licensed general surgeons 
per 100,000 persons in the U.S. in 1990 there were only 12.79 licensed general surgeons 
per 100,000 persons in 2005, a 17 percent decline.11 
Thus, the decline in the net number and per capita rate of general surgeons in 
Illinois cannot sensibly be attributed to any malpractice “crisis” in Illinois or to factors 
unique to the State. Rather, the decline reflects a well-known, long-run, nationwide and, 
                                                 
11 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 1990, http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
cent1990.html (reporting the U.S. population in 1990 as 248,709,873); U.S. Census 
Bureau, American FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov) (reporting the U.S. 
population in 1990 as 295,895,897). 
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indeed, worldwide trend toward surgical sub-specialization. While many surgical sub-
specialties (e.g., Cardiac Surgery, Colorectal Surgery, Neurological Surgery, Oncological 
Surgery, Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, Orthognathic Surgery, Orthopedic Surgery, 
Plastic Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and Vascular Surgery), have maintained 
approximately the same percentage of the total U.S. physician workforce as they did in 
1975, General Surgery has steadily declined across the country in the last three decades, 
from 8 percent of the total U.S. physician workforce in 1975 to nearly half that figure, 
i.e., to 4.2 percent of all physicians in 2005. AMA, PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 5.3. In fact, 
“approximately 70% of graduating surgical residents pursue specialized surgical training, 
and this percentage may be increasing.” Josef E. Fischer, The Impending Disappearance 
of the General Surgeon, 298 JAMA 2191, 2193 (Nov. 14, 2007).12 
3. Contrary to the allegations of the defendants’ amici, Illinois 
was gaining—not losing—physicians in the largely rural half of 
the state “south of Springfield” 
One of the defendants’ amici, the Illinois Hospital Association (“IHA”), relies on 
third-hand hearsay for its twin claims that: (a) “forty-four percent of the residents in 
southern Illinois reported to have lost a physician because of the physician’s liability 
concerns;” and (b) “[n]ot a single neurosurgeon south of Springfield treated head 
trauma.” IHA Br. at 10 (citing “Feb. 23 Hr’g at 9” and a pamphlet privately published by 
                                                 
12 See also Karyn B. Stitzenberg & George F. Sheldon, Progressive Specialization 
Within General Surgery: Adding to the Complexity of Workforce Planning, 201 J. AM. 
COLL. SURG. 925 (2005); C.D. Johnson, Specialization in General Surgery, 78 BRITISH J. 
SURG. 259 (1991). “There are several reasons for surgeons to specialize,” Fischer, 
Impending Disappearance, 298 JAMA at 2191, none of which have anything to do with 
malpractice insurance “crises.” “To be thoroughly competent in the face of a knowledge 
base that is increasing in all areas, many surgeons choose to limit the number and type of 
surgical procedures they perform. Additionally, it may be easier to develop expertise in 
some subspecialties, and more refined expertise often leads to economic rewards. In 
some large urban environments, subspecialists bill at higher fees than general surgeons 
performing the same procedures.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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the Illinois Medical Society and not available on the Internet, The Illinois Medical 
Liability Crisis, at 6). These claims are not only unsupported by any credible empirical 
research, they are contradicted by calculations derived from physician data published by 
the AMA and county population data published by the Illinois Department of Health.  
The population of the 51 counties in the half of the State “south of Springfield”13 
rose from 1,760,700 in 1995 to 1,768,200 in 1999 (just before the latest malpractice 
insurance “crisis” began) to 1,776,440 in 2005.14 At the same time, the net number of 
licensed physicians also increased: from 2,495 in 1995, to 2,895 in 1999, to 3,196 in 
2005. Compare AMA, PC&D (1996-97 ed.), Tbl. 12; PC&D (2001-02 ed.), Tbl. 3.13; 
PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 3.11. The net number of patient care physicians similarly 
increased during this period, from 2,095 in 1995, to 2.373 in 1999, to 2,629 in 2005. Id. 
Matching physician data to population data yields the critical per capita rates of 
all licensed physicians and all patient care physicians in southern Illinois. Notably, the 
rate of all licensed physicians in southern Illinois rose from 141.71 per 100,000 in 1995, 
to 163.73 per 100,000 in 1999, to 179.91 per 100,000 in 2005. Similarly, the rate of all 
patient care physicians in southern Illinois rose from 118.99 per 100,000 in 1995, to 
134.20 per 100,000 in 1999, to 147.99 per 100,000 in 2005. Put differently, the rate of 
                                                 
13 The 51 counties “south of Springfield” (including Sangamon County) are: 
Alexander, Bond, Calhoun, Christian, Clark, Clay, Clinton, Coles, Crawford, 
Cumberland, Douglas, Edgar, Edwards, Effingham, Fayette, Franklin, Gallatin, Greene, 
Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Lawrence, Macoupin, 
Madison, Marion, Massac, Monroe, Montgomery, Morgan, Moultrie, Perry, Pike, 
Pulaski, Randolph, Richland, Saline, Sangamon, Scott, Shelby, St. Clair, Union, Wabash, 
Washington, Wayne, White, and Williamson. 
14 Illinois Dept. of Health, Illinois Population from the Decennial Censuses, by 
County, 1980, 1990 and 2000, http://www.idph.state.il.us/health/census809000.htm; 
Illinois Estimated Population [by County], 2000-2005, http://www.idph.state.il.us/ 
health/estpop2000_to_2009.htm. 
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licensed physicians per 100,000 increased 26.96 percent in the decade before the cap was 
enacted, Similarly, the rate of patient care physicians per 100,000 increased 24.31 
percent during the same span.  
In light of the above and in light of the fact that Illinois, as a whole, has gained 
rather than lost physicians, it is impossible to credit the IHA’s allegation that “forty-four 
percent of the residents in southern Illinois reported to have lost a physician because of 
the physician’s liability concerns.” IHA Br. at 10. Not only has the IHA failed to provide 
any supporting data, the IHA’s claim is absolutely contradicted by the research 
summarized above.15 
Nevertheless, it is readily apparent that the rate per 100,000 of licensed and 
patient care physicians in rural Illinois does not come close to matching the rates for the 
State as a whole. Although tort “reform” advocates often assert that this disparity—which 
is manifest in most states and in most poor urban areas, too—has been caused by 
malpractice crises and can be cured by caps, neither notion withstands minimal scrutiny. 
The idea that physicians are fleeing rural counties in Illinois, or for that matter, in 
other states, because of rising malpractice insurance rates is terribly simplistic. The 
difficulty in recruiting and retaining talented physicians to serve in rural areas has been 
a nationwide problem for more than a century,16 and one that the federal government and 
                                                 
15 It is difficult to imagine that the IHA or any other organization polled all of the 
“residents of southern Illinois.” It is also difficult to believe that “forty-four percent of the 
residents” truly “lost a physician” given that Illinois, as a whole, had gained rather than 
lost physicians. Finally, even if some of the residents “lost” a physician, it is difficult to 
credit their views about why their physicians supposedly left. 
16 There is no doubt that physicians have been leaving rural areas for decades, and 
have been doing so in the absence of malpractice insurance “crises” of any kind. In fact, 
perceptions of physician shortages in the U.S. date back more than a hundred years, to the 
late 1800s, Roger Rosenblatt, Physicians and Rural America, in RURAL HEALTH IN THE 
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state governments have attempted to address for many decades. For example, the 
National Health Service Corps (“NHSC”) was created by Congress in 1970 “due to the 
[rural] health care crises that emerged in the U.S. in the 1950’s and 1960’s,” National 
Health Service Corps, About NHSC, at 1, http://nhsc.bhpr.hrsa.gov/about/history.asp (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2008),17 while the Illinois Rural Health Association (“IRHA”) was 
created in 1989 to deal with identical problems. See Welcome to the Illinois Rural Health 
Association, at 1, http://www.ilruralhealth.org (last visited Aug. 13, 2008). 
According to the American Academy of Family Physicians (“AAFP”), America’s  
rural areas have been medically underserved for decades. While about 20 
percent of the U.S. population lives in rural areas, rural physicians 
comprise only about 10 percent of the net number of working physicians 
in the country. In rural communities of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, 
there are about 90 physicians per 100,000 persons. In major metropolitan 
areas, the ratio is about 300 physicians to every 100,000 persons. In rural 
cities with populations of more than 10,000 persons, there are about 170 
physicians per 100,000 persons. 
AAFP, Rural Practice, Keeping Physicians In (Position Paper) (2002) 1, 
http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/policy/policies/r/ruralpracticekeep.html (emphasis 
added). These “[p]ersistent, intractable” problems are “most likely” to be found in rural 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. 38-51 at 38 (T. Ricketts ed. 1999), and measured declines in the number of rural 
physicians and concerns about these shortages date back to the 1940s. Jack M. Colwill, 
Increasing Numbers of Family Physicians–Implications for Rural America, in U.S. Dept. 
of Health & Human Serv., Update on the Physician Workforce (Aug. 2000), 29-39, 
http://www.cogme.gov/00_8726.pdf. 
17 As the NHSC explains, the rural health care crises that emerged in the U.S. in 
the 1950’s were caused by everything but rising medical malpractice premiums: 
“Physicians who served rural communities began to retire which left many areas of the 
country without health care services. Several factors contributed to the crises including 
the increasing specialized nature of medical practices and rapid technological advances. 
Smaller proportions of medical students entered family medicine. Rural areas and inner-
city neighborhoods competed unsuccessfully with affluent medical practices that offered 
higher compensation, more interaction with other professionals, and job opportunities for 
spouses. Rural communities lacked resources to provide the technologically sophisticated 
facilities that many physicians desired.” About the NHSC, supra, at 1. 
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communities with “[s]parse population, extreme poverty, high proportions of racial and 
ethnic minorities, and lack of physical and cultural amenities.” Id. See also Nat’l Rural 
Health Ass’n, Physician Recruitment & Retention (1998) 1-2, http://www.nrharural.org/ 
dc/issuepapers/ipaper13.html.18 
The principal reason why rural areas around the country have faced, and are 
currently facing, physician shortages is sparse population and the resulting lack of 
patients needed to support a medical practice, especially a specialty practice. Rural 
populations, in Illinois, and the U.S. as a whole, have been declining for tens of decades, 
almost invariably in proportion to urban populations and often even in absolute numbers 
as well. (For example, the Illinois Department of Health reports that 30 of the 51 counties 
in the southern half of Illinois declined in population between 2000 and 2005. IDH, 
Illinois Population from the Decennial Censuses, by County, 1980, 1990 and 2000, 
supra; IDH, Illinois Estimated Population [by County], 2000-2005, supra). 
Notably, the declining population base in rural areas, and the declining number of 
potential patients, plague other medically-related professions, like dentistry and 
                                                 
18 These “[p]ersistent, intractable” problems have nothing to do with the size of or 
changes in malpractice premiums, as shown by the ongoing “brain drain” of physicians 
from the rural areas of many countries (developed, developing, and undeveloped alike, 
including Canada, Australia, and Japan as well as India, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Zimbabwe, none of which have tort systems like the U.S. or medical 
malpractice insurance “crises.” See Fitzhugh Mullan, The Metrics of the Physician Brain 
Drain, 354 N. ENGL. J. MED. 529 (Feb. 2, 2006). Indeed, recruitment of foreign 
physicians to serve in rural areas of the U.S., often aided by subsidies from the federal 
and state governments, began early in the 20th century and continues today. See AMA, 
International Medical Graduates in the U.S. Workforce: A Discussion Paper (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/18/img-workforce-paper.pdf. 
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veterinary medicine, in which there has been no hint of malpractice insurance “crises.”19 
Finally, the falling rural population and the consequent lack of potential clients, also 
affect other non-medical businesses and professions.20  
B. The Malpractice Insurance Crisis Has Not Caused a “Health Care 
Crisis” Because Malpractice Insurance Premiums Constitute a 
Comparatively Small and Historically Declining Portion of the 
Expenses of Running a Small Medical Practice  
It is beyond dispute that, beginning the start of this decade, medical malpractice 
insurance premiums increased in Illinois—just as they did in nearly every state, and just 
as they had across the country in the early 1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s. Jan M. 
                                                 
19 See Clemencia Vargas, et al., Oral Health Care Utilization by U.S. Rural 
Residents, 63 J. PUB. HEALTH DENTISTRY 150 (Summer 2003); Pam Belluck, A New 
Problem for Farmers: Few Veterinarians, NY TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, A-1.  
20 Thus, rural areas have trouble attracting and keeping a patent attorney, a ballet 
company, a stock brokerage firm, a pro hockey team, a molecular biology teacher, a 
violin repairman, and a shoe repair shop. See Timothy Egan, Vanishing Point; Amid 
Dying Towns of Rural Plains, One Makes a Stand, NY TIMES, Dec.1, 2003, at A-1. 
Nowadays, rural communities in Texas and many other states are often too small to field 
11-man football squads. See Jere Longman, Football; Not Everything Is Bigger In Texas, 
NY TIMES, Dec.14, 2003, at A-1. 
The population necessary to support a medical practice tends to be inadequate in 
rural areas; the sparser the population, the fewer the doctors who are needed or willing to 
live and serve in that area; indeed, to support a single general practice doctor, a 
population of at least 2,000 people is necessary and, because physicians prefer to work in 
groups of at least three (so that no one physician need be “on call” 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year), a population of more than 6,000 people is needed to support a three-
physician general practice. U.S. Dept. of HHS, Update on the Physician Workforce, 
supra, at 33. The absence of a population necessary to support a practice is especially 
severe for sub-specialists, such as neurosurgeons; although the number of people needed 
to support a single family-practice doctor is only 2,000, the number needed to support a 
single neurosurgeon is 100,000. Roger Rosenblatt, Rural Health in the United States, 
supra at 41. Thus, 300,000 people are needed to support a three-person neurosurgical 
group. U.S. Dept. of HHS, Update on the Physician Workforce, supra at 33. See also 
U.S. Congress, OTA, Health Care in Rural America, OTA-H-434 (1990) at 318 (“Health 
care professionals may be dissuaded from choosing a rural practice location due to either 
a perceived or actual lack of professional opportunities and benefits.”). 
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Ambrose, Medical Malpractice Reform, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 843, 846 (2007); 
Michelle Mello, Empirical Health Law Scholarship, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 680 (2008). 
Defendants and their amici insinuate, without evidence, that rising premiums are 
not merely undesirable but completely unbearable—so “unaffordable” as to compel 
thousands of Illinois physicians to abandon their practices and flee the State. But this 
thesis is untenable. Empirical research establishes that insurance premiums, while 
periodically rising (and falling) and always irksome, actually constitute a comparatively 
small and historically declining part of the expenses of running a medical practice. 
If the practice of medicine were viewed as a business—and the AMA certainly 
encourages its members to regard it that way, see Arnold S. Relman, Business and 
Professionalism in Medicine at the AMA, 279 JAMA 169 (Jan. 14, 1998)—any rational 
businessperson would realize that malpractice insurance premiums are just one of many 
expenses, and a small one at that, at least in comparison to other business expenses. 
In 2006, Suffolk Law Professor Marc Rodwin and several colleagues published an 
article in Health Affairs (the leading peer-reviewed journal of health policy and research) 
in which he examined thirty years of AMA data and concluded that while the “list price” 
of malpractice premiums periodically rose and fell from 1970 to 2000, the premiums 
actually paid by physicians rarely exceeded 10 percent of a physician’s “total practice 
expenses”—typically amounting to only 6 percent or 7 percent of those expenses—and 
an even smaller percentage of a physician’s “total practice income” or gross revenue. 
Marc A. Rodwin, et al., Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income: Perceptions of a 
Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 750 (May/June 2006). 
Notably, several other expenses, such as office rent, medical supplies and equipment, and 
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health insurance for staff, absorb a far greater portion of a physician’s expenses, and the 
prices of these items appear to be rising just as fast, if not faster, than the cost of 
malpractice insurance.  
A recent follow-up study by Rodwin and colleagues focused on the prices paid by 
physicians for malpractice insurance from 1975 to 2005 in Massachusetts, which, despite 
a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages (Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 231, § 60H), has the 
fourth-highest median malpractice payouts in the country and thus has been categorized 
by the AMA as a “crisis state.” Marc A. Rodwin, et al., Malpractice Premiums in 
Massachusetts, A High-Risk State: 1975 to 2005, 27 HEALTH AFFAIRS 835 (May/June 
2008). Rodwin’s 2008 article found that in 2005 mean malpractice premiums, for the 
coverage level and policy type most frequently purchased, were only $17,810.21 In fact, 
Rodwin found that most physicians paid lower inflation-adjusted premiums in 2005 than 
in 1990. Id. at 835. Nothing in the cap’s legislative record or the record of this case 
indicates that things are different in Illinois. 
Rodwin’s 2006 article also reported that a far greater cause of physicians’ overall 
frustration is declining gross practice revenues, which stem from the policies of 
Medicare, Medicaid, and HMOs/PPOs to “capitate” (or limit) reimbursements for most 
medical procedures. Although physicians tend to scapegoat malpractice plaintiffs as the 
                                                 
21 By comparison, the College of Medicine of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign charges in-state residents $28,342 a year in tuition and fees while 
Northwestern University Medical School charges students $69,276 a year for tuition, 
fees, room, and board. See College of Medicine at Urbana-Champaign-Office of Student 
Affairs, Gen’l Info. for New Medical Students http://www.med.uiuc.edu/students/m1/pdf/ 
General%20Information.pdf (last visited July 31, 2008); Northwestern Univ.-Chicago 
Financial Aid Office, How Much Does a Medical Education Cost at Northwestern?, 
http://chicagofinancialaid.northwestern.edu/medical/2008-09/cost.htm (last visited July 
31, 2008). 
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sole source of their pain, malpractice premiums are a minor irritant compared to other 
reasons why physicians’ gross practice revenues and net practice incomes have been 
declining over the past decade. This explains why the size of, or increases in, malpractice 
premiums have scant effect on the number or rate of physicians practicing in a state. See, 
e.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Defensive Medicine and Disappearing 
Doctors?, 28 REGULATION 24 (Fall 2005). Moreover, as rational business persons, 
physicians are unlikely to make decisions as fundamental as whether or where to practice 
based on cost increases that are episodic, minor in comparison to other practice expenses, 
and minor in comparison to both gross practice revenue and net practice income.  
It is also useful to compare the situation faced by physicians in Illinois with that 
faced by their colleagues in California. California’s Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act (“MICRA”) of 1975 often is described as a panacea and that statute served as 
a model for the latest Illinois cap. Similarly, the Golden State frequently is extolled as a 
paradisiacal place to practice, a state where MICRA has enabled physicians to live free 
from fear, rancor, or want. 
But this picture is a mirage. Seven years ago, the AMA’s in-house magazine 
reported “[m]ore than half of the physicians in California are so dissatisfied” with the 
state of medicine there “that they plan to quit, retire or move out of state in the next three 
years” Jay Greene, Dissatisfied Docs May Soon Be Singing “California, Here I Go!”: 
Managed Care and Low Reimbursement Cited as Reasons Why More than Half of the 
Doctors in California May Quit or Leave the State by 2004. AM. MED. NEWS (Aug. 6, 
2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/08/06/prsd0806.htm. The AMA article 
relied on a comprehensive 2001 study by the California Medical Association (“CMA”) 
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2001 Physician Survey Findings: And Then There Were None: The Coming Physician 
Supply Problem (2001), http://www.cmanet.org/upload/Physician_Supply_(Acrobat).pdf. 
The CMA, in turn, “blame[d] the physician exodus on low reimbursements [because] 
California has the greatest managed care penetration in the nation,” and because 
California physicians are more likely than doctors in other states to have 
Medicare/Medicaid contracts, which “capitates” the fees a physician may collect.22  
Medicare, Medicaid, and HMO/PPO “caps” on physician reimbursements are far 
more disruptive than increases in malpractice premiums, as shown by the fact that 
California physicians—unlike their Illinois colleagues—actually have followed through 
on their threats to flee. The AMA’s 2001 article reported “[t]he U.S. Census Bureau 
reports that over the past decade, California has fallen from 8th to12th place in the nation 
in per capita ratio of doctors to population,” despite MICRA. Greene, Dissatisfied Docs, 
supra. The latest AMA data, from 2005, show that California now ranks as the 17th state 
in the nation in licensed physicians per 100,000 population, behind Illinois, which ranks 
16th. AMA, PC&D (2007 ed.), Tbl. 5.19. Furthermore, California now ranks 21st in 
“patient care” physicians, even further behind Illinois, which ranks as the 12th state in 
that category. Id. Finally, Illinois ranks ahead of every one of its thirteen neighbors in 
patient care physicians per 100,000, with the exception of Minnesota. Id. 
                                                 
22 According to the California Medical Association, “Seventy-five percent of 
physicians have become less satisfied with medical practice in the past five years. . . . 
Low reimbursement, managed care hassles and government regulation are the greatest 
sources of dissatisfaction. 4 percent of physicians plan to leave medical practice in the 
next 3 years. Another 12 percent will reduce their time spent in patient care. 58 percent 
have experienced difficulty attracting other physicians to join a practice. More than 1/4 of 
physicians would no longer choose medicine as a career if starting over today, and more 
than 1/3 of those who would still choose medicine would not choose to practice in 
California.” CMA, And Then There Were None, supra, at ii (emphasis added). 
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As described in Rodwin’s article and as reflected in the California situation, 
medical malpractice premiums are a comparatively small part of a physician’s total 
practice expenses and, as such, should rarely, if ever, have any impact on decisions about 
whether or where to practice medicine. In fact, simple economics suggests there is a 
greater likelihood of physicians withdrawing from practice in a given location due to 
increases in office rents, payroll costs, and automobile lease rates than due to increases in 
malpractice insurance costs. Although insurance industry economics cause periodic and 
temporary spikes in malpractice premiums, it is necessary to look at the larger and 
longer-term picture. Specifically, although physicians spend three to five percent of their 
gross practice income on medical malpractice costs, they spend substantially more on 
payroll costs and office rent. A physician who stops practicing because of a malpractice 
insurance increase would be just as likely to retire due to increased health insurance costs 
for his or her office staff, or because of increased rent for office space. If increased 
malpractice insurance costs justify legislation to bail out physicians, they could just as 
easily demand a repeal of minimum wage laws. Affordability is a relative term, not an 
absolute one, which explains why extremely few physicians—largely older ones with 
substantial assets—have the will and the wherewithal to carry out their threats to retire. 
This insight about physicians’ hollow retirement threats leads to similar insights 
about their threats to flee one state for another or from rural areas to urban ones. In March 
2005 the AMA reported that malpractice claims had skyrocketed simultaneously “across 
America” and that malpractice awards also had exploded simultaneously across the 
country, producing a “full-blown crisis” in twenty states (including Illinois) and near 
“crisis” conditions in twenty-three more states. AMA, America’s Medical Liability 
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Crisis: A National View (March 21, 2005), http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html. (last visited Jan. 12, 2008); see AMA 
President Warns Kansans About Lawsuit Abuse, 3 BUS. ADVOCATE No. 9 (Mar. 4, 2005), 
http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/Reports/kansas%203-4-05(3).doc. (citing the 
AMA’ 2005 National View report)). Given that forty-three states were in or near “crisis” 
in 2005, any rational businessperson would think twice about moving his or her practice 
and family out of a known “frying pan” and into an unknown “fire.” 
Similar considerations apply to rural physicians who might contemplate fleeing to 
urban counties. Even if they could find positions compatible with their training and 
experience (which might not be easy given that rural physicians are proportionately more 
likely to practice in primary-care specialties), malpractice premiums are rarely lower in 
urban areas, while the cost of living is higher and competition is stiffer. Thus, in addition 
to the not inconsiderable costs of relocating both one’s practice and one’s family, rural 
physicians face a lower “real” standard of living in urban areas.23 
Finally, along the same vein, it should be noted that it is rather difficult and 
extremely rare for a physician to switch specialties, e.g., from obstetrics/gynecology to 
ophthamology, in mid-career. This fact, combined with the fact that the AMA says that, 
                                                 
23 Although “[a]verage annual physician incomes are somewhat lower in rural 
areas than in urban areas—$204,000 vs. $218,000,” a very “different picture emerges 
when one looks at physicians’ ‘real’ compensation, or the purchasing power of their 
incomes after accounting for differences in the cost of living, which varies considerably 
across the nation and generally is lower in rural areas. . . . The average income of rural 
physicians adjusted for the cost of living was significantly higher than urban physicians’ 
—$225,000 vs. $199,000. This translates into rural physician incomes providing about 13 
percent more purchasing power than urban physician incomes.” James D. Reschovsky & 
Andrea Staiti, et al. Physician Incomes in Rural and Urban America, ISSUE BRIEF 92 
(Center for Studying Health Systems Change Jan. 2005), § 1 & Tbls. 1 & 2, 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/725/725.pdf. 
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to a greater or lesser extent, almost all specialties are suffering from malpractice premium 
increases, make it extremely unlikely that a physician would make the difficult and 
expensive jump from one beleaguered specialty—one in which they have trained for 
years and established a reputation in the community—to a different and potentially 
equally beleaguered specialty. The AMA’s data confirm that most physicians, like most 
people, prefer to stick with the devil they know. 
The alleged “fact” that rising prices are unaffordable is not a fact at all. It is an 
untested, untenable, and irrational assumption, one that this Court should not indulge. 
C.  There Is No Credible Evidence that a “Torrent” of Malpractice 
Claims and an “Explosion in the Size of Payouts” Existed, Let Alone 
Caused the Latest Insurance Crisis or the Crises that Periodically 
Have Bedeviled Doctors in Illinois—and Nearly Every Other State—
Over the Last Thirty Years. 
1.  Government and academic researchers agree that malpractice 
insurance crises are not caused by “skyrocketing” malpractice 
claims and “exploding” malpractice awards 
Although there is no dispute that, beginning around the turn of this century, 
medical liability insurance premiums for some doctors rose dramatically in Illinois, the 
cause of the problem is hotly contested. The defendants contend that insurance “rate 
increases are ‘driven almost entirely by the explosion in the size of payouts in the state’” 
and the unprecedented “torrent of medical malpractice litigation.” Levi-D’Ancona Br. at 
11, 10 (emphasis added; citation deleted). The AMA and the American Tort Reform 
Association (“ATRA”) agree. AMA, Medical Liability Reform–NOW! (2008), 1-5, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/-1/mlrnow.pdf; ATRA, Medical Liability 
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Reform (http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7338 (last visited Aug. 7, 2008). 
Such explanations reprise ones offered in every previous “crisis.”24 
On the other hand, state insurance regulators (including Deirdre K. Manna, 
Illinois’ Director of Insurance; see Manna testimony, 94th Ill. Gen. Ass’y, H. 
Proceedings, Mar. 1, 2005, at 7:15-24; 94th Ill. Gen. Ass’y, S. Proceedings, Mar. 1, 2005, 
at 33), private insurance watchdog groups, and consumer organizations—joined by many 
independent scholars, such as amicus Tom Baker, a professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and formerly the Director of the Insurance Law Center at the 
University of Connecticut Law School—explain that periodic premium spikes are caused 
by cut-throat “cash-flow” underwriting policies and what business reporters commonly 
describe as the boom-and-bust, “wildly cyclical nature of the property-casualty insurance 
business,” which includes the medical insurance industry. Sarah H. Klein, Med-Mal Mess 
on the Mend?, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUS., June 14, 2004, at 1. See Tom Baker, Medical 
Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (2005); 
Finley, Hidden Victims, 53 EMORY L. J. at 1270. 
In the regulators’ and scholars’ view, the problem arises from the fact that in good 
economic times insurers underestimate future payouts and under-price premiums. In 
addition, downturns in the bond and stock markets, where insurers invest much of their 
reserves, exacerbate their financial problems. “[I]nsurers compete too hotly for years at a 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Tom Baker, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 45-67 (2005); Marc 
Galanter, The Three-Legged Pig: Risk Redistribution and Antinomianism in American 
Legal Culture, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 47, 48-49 (2002) (summarizing tort “reformers’” 
arguments); Douglas Kysar, et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an 
Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 786-87 (2006) 
(same); David M. Studdert, Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 (Jan. 15, 
2004) (same); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the 
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 734-52 (1998) (same). 
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time, pricing policies cheaply because they want to collect premium dollars and invest 
them,” as well as to build market share; “[d]octors don’t complain much during these 
periods.” Id. (emphasis added). In his recent book on the medical malpractice “crisis” 
controversy, Professor Baker carefully reviewed the best available empirical evidence 
and then concluded: 
the two most recent medical liability insurance crises [mid-1980s and 
early 2000s] did not result from sudden or dramatic increases in medical 
malpractice settlements or jury verdicts. Instead … the crises resulted 
from dramatic increases in the amount of money that the insurance 
industry put in reserve for claims. Those reserves increases were so big 
because the insurance industry systematically under reserved in the years 
leading up to the crisis. 
Tom Baker, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 53-54 (2005). Amicus Charles Silver and 
his colleagues share Baker’s conclusion. After systematically analyzing fifteen years of 
“closed” medical malpractice claims collected by the Texas Department of Insurance, 
they found no connection between medical malpractice claim outcomes and any medical 
liability insurance crisis.  
This evidence suggests that no crisis involving malpractice claim 
outcomes occurred. It thus also suggests a weak connection between 
claims-related costs and short-to-medium-term fluctuations in insurance 
premiums. . . . [T]he more likely explanation is that much of the rise in 
premiums reflects insurance market dynamics, not litigation dynamics. 
Bernard Black, Charles Silver, et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim 
Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 207, 210 (July 2005). 
The end result, these and other scholars contend, is that when economic 
fluctuations in the business cycle squeeze insurers’ income and reserves, they feel 
compelled to raise their rates and feel it convenient to scapegoat malpractice victims 
(who supposedly file frivolous claims at the drop of a hat), malpractice lawyers (who 
allegedly take on the expense of preparing for any case regardless of its evident lack of 
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merit), credulous jurors (who ostensibly sympathize with all plaintiffs and despise all 
“deep-pocket” defendants), and craven or incompetent trial and appellate judges (who 
putatively are in the pocket of the plaintiffs’ bar). As Professor Galanter explains: 
This “jaundiced view” is particularly prevalent among business, media and 
political elites. Corporate spokesmen and their political allies mournfully 
recite the woes of a legal system in which Americans, egged on by 
avaricious lawyers, sue too readily, and irresponsible juries and activist 
judges waylay blameless businesses at enormous cost to social and 
economic well-being. The legal system, we are told, is arbitrary, berserk, 
crazy and demented. It has “spun out of control.” The resulting “litigation 
explosion” is unraveling the social fabric and undermining the economy. 
Galanter, The Three-Legged Pig, supra, 22 MISS C.L. REV. at 48. See David Hyman & 
Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, 
Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (2006) (noting that “[m]any of the preceding 
claims are facially implausible,” and “[m]ost of the preceding claims are also inconsistent 
with empirical studies of the medical malpractice liability system.”). 
While complaints about “too many lawsuits and excessive jury awards have been 
a feature of the tort reform political rhetoric” since the 1970s, Thomas A. Eaton, et al., A 
Profile of Tort Litigation in Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627, 
631 n.6 (1996), see Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF 
REFORM 58-59 (1995), a “growing body of research indicates that the tort system in 
operation is much different from the one portrayed in the popular and political rhetoric of 
tort reform. There is no evidence [nationally] of an explosion in tort filings, and there are 
few signs of runaway juries.” Thomas A. Eaton, Another Brick in the Wall: An Empirical 
Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1900s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049, 1058 (2000) 
(emphasis added). 
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Much of the “growing body of research” published before 2000 was undertaken 
by state and federal government researchers.25 That early research was corroborated by 
empirical research conducted by national bar associations and research institutes.26 
Finally, this early research was confirmed by still more empirical research published in 
law reviews and peer reviewed social science journals.27  
                                                 
25 See Eaton, 34 GA. L. REV. at 1058 n.6 (citing Carol J. DeFrances, et al., U.S. 
Dept of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (“DOJ/BJS”), Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts, 1996: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties (1999); Carol J. 
DeFrances, et al., DOJ/BJS, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992: Civil Jury Cases 
and Verdicts in Large Counties (1995); Marika F.X. Litras & Carol J. DeFrances, 
DOJ/BJS, Federal Justice Statistics Program: Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 1996-97 
(1999); Erik Moller, et al., DOJ/BJS, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since 1985, at xiii 
(1996); Steven Smith, et al., DOJ/BJS, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992: Tort 
Cases in Large Counties (1995). 
26 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Facts About the American Civil Justice 
System 1-2, 5, 7 (1996); American Board of Trial Advocates, Civil Justice Reform 
Proposals, 5 (1992); American Law Institute (“ALI”), Reporters’ Study, Enterprise 
Responsibility for Personal Injury 5 (1991); Thomas D. Rowe, ALI Study on Paths to a 
“Better Way,” 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 829-47 (1989). 
27 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1093 (1996); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about 
the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter, The Day After the 
Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Daniels & Martin, CIVIL JURIES AND THE 
POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1996); Deborah Jones-
Merritt, & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999); David J. Nye, & Donald G. Gifford, The Myth of a Liability 
Insurance Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REV. 909 (1988); David W. 
Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 256, 302-06, 324 (1989); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the 
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). 
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This “body of research” has continued to grow since 2000.28 Moreover, this 
research, new and old, has been recently recapitulated by two scholars, with impeccable 
credentials, Arthur R. Miller, Professor of Law at New York University,29 and Lucinda 
M. Finley, Vice-Provost for Faculty Affairs at the University at Buffalo Law School. As 
Professor Miller noted, “claims of the alleged ‘litigation explosion’ are exaggerated; 
indeed, that evidence casts doubt on the very existence of a significant increase.” Arthur 
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 
78 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 982, 992-95 (2003). Professor Finley similarly notes: 
There is little empirical evidence to support the claims of the critics of the 
tort system. Indeed, most of the available empirical research refutes the 
criticisms. Tort filings as a percentage of civil case filings have been on a 
continual decline since 1990. Overall tort case filings in the thirty-five 
most populous states declined 4% between 1993 and 2002. When adjusted 
for increasing population, there was a median decline of 19% in tort cases 
from 1992 to 2001.  
Finley, Hidden Victims, 53 EMORY L.J. at 1268 (emphasis added; footnotes deleted). 
Professor Finley specifically found no empirical support for medical malpractice 
claims were “skyrocketing” in number or that medical malpractice awards were 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Brian J. Ostrom, et al., Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2001: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT 26 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar, et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: 
Why an Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785 (2006); 
Hyman & Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation & Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives 
Stupid, supra, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085; William Haltom & Michael McCann, DISTORTING 
THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 73-110 (2004); Galanter, The 
Three-Legged Pig, supra, 22 MISS. C. L. REV. 47; Seth A. Seabury, et al., Forty Years of 
Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1, 3 (March 2004). 
29 Professor Miller previously served as the Bruce Bromley Professor of Law at 
Harvard. He is, inter alia, a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, the reporter for the American Law Institute’s 
Project on Complex Litigation, and a member of Special Advisory Group to the Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court on Federal Civil Litigation. 
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“exploding” in size. In fact, the empirical evidence showed the contrary to be true. 
Medical malpractice case filings dropped 4% nationally from 1997 to 
2000. There was an increase in medical malpractice case filings in 2001, 
but when adjusted for population increases there was an overall decline of 
1% in medical malpractice case filings from 1992 to 2001. Medical 
malpractice case filings rose again in 2002, for a total increase in filings 
for the five year period from 1998 to 2002 of 6%, which amounts to an 
average increase of just over 1% annually. During this five-year period the 
U.S. population grew by 4.5%, so the per capita increase in filings is 
negligible. … The median jury award in 1992 in the seventy-five largest 
U.S. counties was $253,000; in 1996 the median medical malpractice jury 
verdict was $286,000. In 2001, the median verdict increased to $431,000. 
This is a 70% increase from the median ten years prior in 1992, but 
during this decade medical costs increased by 51.7%, and general 
inflation, which would drive up wage-based damage awards, was up 
26.2%. In addition to inflation, this growth in median awards can also be 
explained by the fact that in 2001, 90% of medical malpractice trials 
involved plaintiffs who suffered the most severe injuries of death or 
permanent disability, and damage awards are the highest in these types of 
cases. 
53 EMORY L.J. at 1268-69 (emphasis added; citations deleted). 
Indeed, as Professor Baker has explained: 
Litigation behavior and malpractice claim payments did not change in any 
significant, systemic sense between 1970 and 1975, between 1981 and 
1986, or between 1996 and 2001. What changed, instead, were insurance 
market conditions and the investment and cost projections that the 
insurance market built into medical malpractice insurance premiums over 
those periods. Insurers that had offered low prices based on rosy scenarios 
in 1970, 1981, and 1996 switched to high prices based on pessimistic 
scenarios in 1975, 1986, and 2001. 
Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 
at 394 (emphasis added; citations deleted).30 
                                                 
30 Professor Finley echoes Professor Baker’s views: “During the 1990s, the 
insurance market, including medical malpractice, experienced what is known as a ‘soft 
market’—with profits padded by the burgeoning stock market, insurance companies 
reduced premiums, relaxed underwriting criteria, and liberally wrote policies. But, at the 
beginning of the new century, the liability insurance market significantly hardened. 
Investment returns plummeted, and some of the poor underwriting decisions made in the 
previous decade began to generate claims. Insurance companies, particularly in the 
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Collectively, these data undercut the claims of tort and medical malpractice 
“reformers” about “runaway” juries. 
Far from the picture of overly generous, plaintiff friendly, “runaway” 
juries painted by tort reform proponents, the empirical reality of the tort 
system and medical malpractice cases is one of case filings holding steady 
with population increases, juries who skeptically assess plaintiffs’ cases, 
and juries who award damages commensurate with the seriousness of the 
injury and with medical inflation. The empirical reality picture—that it is 
not the actions of injured plaintiffs that are driving the sharp increase in 
medical malpractice insurance premiums—does not change when overall 
claims filed with insurance companies are added to the canvas. Similar to 
the downward trend in court cases, the trend in overall malpractice claims 
is also down. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
reports a 4% decrease in claims between 1995 and 2000, from 90,212 
claims filed in 1995 to 86,480 in 2000. According to the federal 
government’s National Practitioner Data Bank, the median total physician 
payment to a malpractice claimant rose 35% from 1997 to 2001—the 
years that should have fueled the current crisis in rising insurance 
premiums—from $100,000 to $135,000. This is less than the medical cost 
inflation rate. While total medical malpractice insurance costs have 
increased less than half the rate of medical cost inflation, premiums have 
increased at a much higher rate.  
53 EMORY L.J. at 1270 (emphasis added; footnotes deleted). 
As Professor Finley summarizes the consensus view among social scientists and 
legal scholars who have researched the issues and studied the data: 
the empirical picture shows tort filings are down, medical malpractice case 
and claim filings are flat or declining per capita, median verdicts are 
increasing only marginally more than medical inflation and are 
commensurate with injury severity, median claims payouts are increasing 
                                                                                                                                                 
medical malpractice area, began to raise premium rates dramatically while restricting 
coverage.” 53 EMORY L.J. at 1263. See id. at 1263. See also U.S. General Accounting 
Office (“GAO”), Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed to 
Increased Premium Rates 03-702 (June 2003), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03702.pdf; Rachel Zimmerman, Insurers’ Malpractice Helped Provoke Malpractice 
“Crisis,” WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at A1; Attorney General of Massachusetts Francis 
X. Bellotti, et al., National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”), ANALYSIS OF 
THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND “UNAFFORDABILITY” OF 
LIABILITY INSURANCE 45 (1986); J. Robert Hunter, Americans for Insur. Reform, 
Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable Losses/Unstable Rates (Oct. 10, 2002), 2-3, 
http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosses.pdf. 
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less than the recent rates of increase in insurance premiums, and numbers 
of doctors are not declining in states hit hard by huge increases in 
insurance premiums.  
53 EMORY L.J. at 1271-72 (footnotes deleted). 
2.  Recent, Illinois-specific empirical research regarding 
malpractice claims and awards is consistent with analyses of 
long-running national trends and completely undermines the 
myth that a “torrent” of malpractice claims and an 
“explosion” of “malpractice payouts” existed and were the 
cause of spiking insurance premiums and that a cap on 
noneconomic damages was needed or is rational. 
It is conceivable, of course, that Illinois is unique, that malpractice claims truly 
were “skyrocketing” and that malpractice “payouts” truly were “exploding” in the State, 
and that “skyrocketing claims” and “exploding awards” truly caused a malpractice 
insurance crisis. ATRA and President George W. Bush certainly thought so, urging the 
legislature to enact a cap because Cook, Madison, and St. Clair counties were three of 
nation’s worst five “judicial hellholes.” ATRA, Judicial Hellholes—2005, 20-28 (2005), 
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2005/hellholes2005.pdf.31  
In order to test these claims, the Illinois Bar Association commissioned Professor 
Vidmar to investigate several interrelated questions:  
Have medical malpractice claims increased? Have jury trials increased? 
Have jury awards for medical malpractice increased? Have Madison and 
St. Clair counties earned their reputation as “judicial hellholes” insofar as 
medical malpractice claims are concerned? Is there evidence that doctors 
are leaving the state or certain areas of the state as a result of jury awards? 
Neil Vidmar, Med. Malpractice & the Tort System in Ill., 93 ILL. BAR. J. 340, 341 (2005). 
                                                 
31 President Bush kicked off his campaign for a federal cap on malpractice 
damages by visiting Madison County and announcing that he had found it to be a 
“judicial hellhole.” Georgina Gustin & Phillip Dine, Insurance Regulations Bear Blame, 
Critics Say, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 2, 2005, at A1. 
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As detailed in both Professor Vidmar’s 85-page identically titled report to the 
State Bar (which the Bar adopted in its entirety and tendered to the legislature in 2005, 
before the cap was enacted, see http://www.isba.org/medicalmalpracticestudy.pdf) and in 
his follow-up law review article, Neil Vidmar & Kara MacKillop, “Judicial Hellholes:” 
Medical Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the “Doctor Exodus” in Illinois, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1309 (2006), he carefully combed all relevant sources of data, including Cook 
County Jury Verdict Reporter, Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter, databases in 
Westlaw, Lexis, and Findlaw, the U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(“DOJ/BJS”), the AMA’s annual reports on PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND 
DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., and the National Practitioner Data Bank. See 93 ILL. BAR. J. at 
341.32 He focused on two regions: Cook County (an ostensible “judicial hellhole”) and 
DuPage County (which, along with Cook, comprises almost half the State’s population of 
and more than half of its physicians); and Madison and St. Clair Counties, because of 
their status as “judicial hellholes.”  
Professor Vidmar’s findings are completely consistent with the research 
undertaken and published by many other scholars. In brief, Professor Vidmar’s analysis 
of malpractice filings, verdicts, and post-verdict adjustments to awards, i.e., net payouts, 
revealed the following about Cook and DuPage counties: 
a.  The 10-year data show no upward trends in total medical 
malpractice filings or in malpractice filings per 100 treating physicians from 1994 
through 2004, when adjusted for population growth. 
                                                 
32 It should be noted especially that although detailed records on closed medical 
malpractice claims are collected by the Illinois Department of Insurance from all insurers 
that provide such coverage in Illinois, as mandated by state law, those records were 
requested by, but not made available to, Professor Vidmar. See 93 ILL. BAR. J. at 342. 
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b.  There was a modest decrease in the number medical malpractice 
trials between 1996 and 2001.  
c.  Plaintiff “win rates” at trial increased to a modest degree, but this 
change reasonably may be ascribed to other factors related to how cases are selected for 
trial. At the same time, a different set of data showed no increase in jury trials or in 
plaintiff win rates between 2001 and 2004. 
d.  Settlement mechanisms—such as pre-verdict “high-low 
agreements,” acceptance of the limits of the doctor’s insurance policy, and other 
devices—showed that many jury verdicts were substantially reduced in the post-verdict 
phase of the lawsuit, as well as on appeal. 
See 93 ILL. BAR. J. at 342-44 (emphasis added). 
Professor Vidmar’s analysis of Madison and St. Clair data similarly showed: 
a.  Over the 13.5 year period from 1992 through the first six months 
of 2005, there were only eleven jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff in medical malpractice 
cases were found in the courts of Madison and St. Clair counties, counties whose 
combined population exceeds 520,000.  
b.  During that same 13.5 year period, only two verdicts exceeded $1 
million, and one of those was overturned on appeal. 
c.  There was no evidence to support the perception that medical 
malpractice jury trials in these counties were frequent or that jury verdicts were, by any 
standard, undeserved let alone “outrageous.”  
93 ILL. BAR. J. at 344-45; 59 VAND. L. REV. at 1313. (Emphasis added; citations deleted). 
After investigating each verdict, Professor Vidmar concluded: 
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These data lend scant support to the claims that Madison and St. Clair 
counties are “judicial hellholes” for medical malpractice defendants who 
go before juries. Overall, jury trials are rare, plaintiff verdicts are 
infrequent, and a strong case can be made that the amounts awarded were 
justified. While the intense media coverage of [one large] verdict likely 
helped further public perceptions of excessive jury verdicts, it is 
imperative to note that [that case] was decided by a judge, not a jury. 
Further, since the defendant was a federal employee, the U.S. government, 
not private liability insurers, is responsible for the award. 
 
59 VAND. L.R. at 1320 (emphasis added). 
In summary, in view of the consistent results of these numerous studies of 
national and Illinois-specific data, it is clear that the civil justice system was not the cause 
of large increases in malpractice premiums but merely the pretext for such increases.  
CONCLUSION 
Empirical research by the amici and other scholars establish that malpractice 
“payouts” were not “explo[ding]” in size and there was no “torrent” of malpractice 
claims in Illinois; to the contrary, claims were declining and payouts were flat.  
The State’s civil justice system did not cause malpractice premiums to rise in 
Illinois. To the contrary, premiums rose in Illinois, as they periodically do nationwide, 
because of nationwide insurance industry practices and the “boom-and-bust” malpractice 
insurance business/underwriting cycle. 
Although malpractice premiums rose in Illinois, the increases were not 
unbearable, as malpractice insurance comprised a comparatively small and historically 
declining portion physicians’ gross expenses and net income; consequently, malpractice 
insurance never became unavailable or unaffordable. 
Although physicians were frustrated by rising premiums, in reality there was a net 
increase in the number of doctors licensed and practicing in the State and in the rate of 
licensed and “patient care” physicians per capita. Physicians were not fleeing Illinois, 
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rural areas, or specialty practices. The civil justice system did not cause a physician 
“exodus” or “health care crisis” in Illinois. Indeed, there was no such “crisis” in the State. 
John Adams said “‘[f]acts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, 
our inclinations, or the dictums of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and 
evidence.’” John Adams, Argument in Defense of the [British] Soldiers in the Boston 
Massacre Trials (1770), in John Adams, 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 269 (L. 
Wroth., ed., 1965). See David McCullough, JOHN ADAMS 68 (2001). Here, the facts 
stubbornly show no “health care crisis,” no other need for a cap on noneconomic 
damages, and no rational basis for the enactment of the cap at issue. Consequently, 
inasmuch as 735 ILCS 5/2-1706.5(a) does not “bear a rational relationship to the public 
interest sought to be served,” Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003), 
that statutory cap violates the Illinois constitution’s prohibition on special legislation and 
the Illinois Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. 
For these reasons, amici urge this Court to uphold the trial court’s decision 
invalidating the cap.  
     Respectfully submitted,  
 
___________________________________ 
EDWARD J. KIONKA 
Southern Illinois University School of Law 
Lesar Law Building 
1150 Douglas Drive, MS 6804  
Carbondale, IL  62901 
Phone: (618) 521-5555 
 
Attorney for Amici Curiae Neil Vidmar, et al. 
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APPENDIX A 
BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF AMICI 
 
 NEIL VIDMAR is the Russell M. Robinson II Professor of Law, Duke Law School, 
and Professor of Psychology at Duke University. He holds a Ph.D. in social psychology 
from the University of Illinois and conducts empirical studies on issues in the legal 
system, including the subject of medical malpractice litigation. He is co-author (with 
Cornell Law Professor and fellow amicus) Valerie P. Hans of THE AMERICAN JURY: THE 
VERDICT (2007) and JUDGING THE JURY (1986); author of MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND 
THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP 
POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); and editor and author of WORLD 
JURY SYSTEMS (2000). He has published more than 125 articles in law reviews and social 
science journals (e.g., Stanford Law Review; Law & Human Behavior; Law & Society 
Review; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Duke Law Journal). He reviews research 
proposals for the National Science Foundation and serves or has served on the editorial 
boards of peer review journals such as Law & Human Behavior; Law & Society Review; 
Law & Social Inquiry; Journal of Applied Social Psychology; Public Policy & Law; and 
the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. Among those articles are: Million Dollar Medical 
Malpractice Cases in Florida: Post-verdict and Pre-suit Settlements, 59 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 1343 (2006); “Judicial Hellholes,” Medical Malpractice Claims, Verdicts and the 
“Doctor Exodus” in Illinois, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1309 (2006); Medical Malpractice 
and the Tort System in Illinois, 93 ILL. B. J. 340 (2005); Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: 
An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries and Social Policy,  38 
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1217 (2005); Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical 
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Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida. 54 DEPAUL L. REV.315 (2005); Tort 
Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the 
Disease and Prescribing a Remedy, 22 MISSISSIPPI COLL. L. REV. 9 (2002); Jury Awards 
for Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict Adjustment of Those Awards. 48 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 265 (1998); The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An empirical perspective, 
40 ARIZONA L. REV. 849 (1998); Pap and Circumstance: What jury verdict statistics can 
tell us about jury behavior and the tort system, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994/1996); 
Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/ Medical 
Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885 (1994); The Unfair 
Criticism of Medical Malpractice Juries, 76 JUDICATURE 118 (1992); Empirical Evidence 
on the “Deep Pockets” Hypothesis: Jury awards for pain and suffering in medical 
malpractice cases,  43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993); Assessments of non-economic damage 
awards in medical negligence: a comparison of jurors with legal professionals, 78 Iowa 
L. Rev. 883 (1993). He has authored amicus briefs submitted to the U. S. Supreme Court 
in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007): Ledbetter v. 
Connecticut, 547 U.S. 1082 (Mem.) (2006); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1999). He has also tendered affidavits bearing on tort cases in various states, 
including Best v. Taylor Machine, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 228 Ill. Dec. 636 
(1997). Vidmar has lectured on judging scientific evidence for judicial education 
programs in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Professor Vidmar’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/vidmar/cv 
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TOM BAKER is Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania School of Law. 
From 1997 to 2008, he was the Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law and Director of the 
Insurance Law Center at the University of Connecticut. He teaches, researches, and 
writes about insurance, risk, and responsibility in a wide variety of settings, using 
methods and perspectives drawn from economics, sociology, and history, as well as law. 
His book, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005), pulls 
together the empirical research on medical malpractice and liability and proposes an 
evidence-based approach to medical liability reform. He is the author of INSURANCE LAW 
AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (Aspen 2003; 2nd ed. 2008) and many 
articles and book chapters. He also is a contributing editor of EMBRACING RISK: THE 
CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Univ. of Chicago Press 2002), 
which helped to establish the emerging sociology of risk and insurance. Among his 
numerous articles are: Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 
DEPAUL L. REV.393 (2005) and Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study 
Conclusions about the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
501 (2005). Baker has taught insurance and related courses at Columbia Law School, the 
University of Miami School of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, Yale Law School, and the 
Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in addition to the University of 
Connecticut and the University of Pennsylvania. A member of the Scientific Committee 
of the Geneva Association for Risk and Insurance Studies, he regularly lectures on 
insurance in academic and professional settings. He is the founder and facilitator of the 
Insurance and Society Study Group, an interdisciplinary group of scholars engaged in 
insurance-related research. Before entering law teaching at the University of Miami, 
53 
Professor Baker clerked for Hon. Juan R. Torruella of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, practiced with the firm of Covington & Burling, and served as 
Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent Counsel (Walsh) investigating Iran-
Contra. He received his B.A. and J.D. from Harvard University, magna cum laude.  
Professor Baker’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/thbaker/ 
RALPH L. BRILL has been a member of the faculty of Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, since 1961. He has served in administrative 
positions as Dean, Associate Dean and Director of Research and Writing during that 
time. He has taught Torts and Tort-related courses for most of those years. He also has 
served as consultant to lawyers and law firms in several landmark cases, including as co-
author of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association amicus briefs in Wright v. Central 
DuPage Hospital, 63 Ill. 2d 313 (1976) (caps on damages and required screening panels 
in malpractice cases unconstitutional), and Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 
432 (1992) (CTA had duty to warn foreseeable trespasser of dangers of the electrified 
third rail). For three years, Professor Brill published, for Shepard’s Inc., The Illinois Tort 
Reporter, and published numerous articles analyzing aspects of Illinois tort law and 
practice. Active in all aspects of professional activity, Professor Brill has served as chairs 
of the Civil Rights and Responsibilities Committee and the Communication Skills 
Committee of the American Bar Association, the Development of the Law Committee 
and Legal Education Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, and on the Boards of 
the Legal Writing Institute, the Association of Legal Writing Directors, The Illinois 
Institute for Continuing Legal Education, and the Children’s Legal Clinic. For a 
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combined task force of the Illinois Bar Association and Chicago Bar Association, 
Professor Brill drafted the Minimum Continuing Legal Education Rules adopted by the 
Illinois Supreme Court. 
Professor Brill’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/rbrill/ 
MARTHA CHAMALLAS holds the Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law at the Moritz 
College of Law at the Ohio State University, where she teaches Torts, Employment 
Discrimination and Feminist Legal Theory. The University recognized her excellence by 
naming her as one of the two campus-wide University Distinguished Lecturers for the 
academic year 2006-2007. Prior to joining the Moritz College of Law in 2002, Professor 
Chamallas was on the faculty at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. She also has 
taught at Louisiana State University Law Center, the University of Iowa College of Law, 
Washington University School of Law, and the University of Richmond School of Law. 
Professor Chamallas earned a B.A., cum laude in Sociology from Tufts University in 
1971 and a J.D. (Order of the Coif), from Louisiana State University Law Center in 1975. 
Following graduation from law school, Professor Chamallas clerked for the Honorable 
Charles Clark of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and served as an attorney 
for the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Civil Rights Division. She is 
the author of INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 2003) and more than 
50 book chapters, articles, essays, and other scholarly publications including, Vanished 
From the First Year: Lost Torts and Deep Structures in Tort Law in CANONS OF LAW 
(Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds., 2000); The September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51 (2003); 
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Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2001); 
The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); 
Condensed in A Woman’s Worth: Gender Bias in Damage Awards, 31 TRIAL 38 (1995); 
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort 
Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1994). 
Professor Chamallas’ complete curriculum vita can be viewed at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/cv/chamallas_martha.pdf. 
STEPHEN DANIELS is a Research Professor and Senior Research Fellow at the 
American Bar Foundation in Chicago, IL and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at 
Northwestern University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. His research focuses on law and public policy and the various 
aspects of the American civil justice system. He has written on trial courts, juries, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the politics of civil justice reform – including the areas of medical 
malpractice, products liability, and punitive damages. He is co-author (with American 
Bar Foundation Research Professor and Senior Research Fellow, and fellow amicus, 
Joanne Martin) of CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (Northwestern Univ. Press, 
1995), and author or co-author of numerous articles in law reviews (e.g., Texas Law 
Review, Minnesota Law Review, Wisconsin Law Review) and social science journals 
(e.g., Law & Society Review, Law & Policy, Justice System Journal) focusing on law 
and public policy. Included among those articles are: Alive and Well (Maybe) in Texas: 
Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort Reform, 51 N.Y. L. REV. 286 (2007); Plaintiffs’ 
Lawyers, Specialization, and Medical Malpractice, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1051 (2006); 
The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access, 55 
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DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006); The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L. J. 1225 
(2004); It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of 
Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1781 (2002); Personal Injury Law 
Practice, in The Oxford Companion to American Law. (Oxford Univ. Press, Kermit Hall, 
ed.,  2002); The Impact That It Has Had is Between People’s Ears: Tort Reform, Mass 
Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000); Access Denied: The 
Subtle Effects of Tort Reform, TRIAL, 263 (July 1997); Persistence Is Not Always a 
Virtue: Tort Reform, Civil Liability for Health Care, and the Lack of Empirical Evidence, 
15 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 3 (1997); Tracing the Shadow of the Law: Jury 
Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases, 14 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 4 (1990); Caseload 
Dynamics and the Nature of Change: The Civil Business of Trial Courts in Four 
Counties, 1870 to 1960, 24 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 299 (1990); The Question of Jury 
Competence and the Politics of Tort Reform, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 269 
(1989); Are Jury Awards Increasing? 26 JUDGES’ JOURNAL 10 (1987); Jury Verdicts and 
the “Crisis” in Civil Justice: Some Findings from an Empirical Study, 11 JUSTICE 
SYSTEM J. 321 (1986). He reviews research proposals for the National Science 
Foundation and manuscripts for peer reviewed journals in the law and society field and in 
political science. He is a current member of the editorial board for Justice System 
Journal, a peer-reviewed journal.  
Professor Daniels complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/faculty/profile/1/bio.html 
THOMAS A. EATON is the J. Alton Hosch Professor at the University of Georgia 
School of Law where he has taught for more than twenty-five years. He has conducted 
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numerous empirical studies on tort litigation. These studies have been published in the 
Georgia Law Review, the Yale Law and Policy Review, the Yale Journal on Regulation, 
and the Journal of Legal Studies. Among the many articles he has written are: Of 
Frivolous Litigation And Runaway Juries: A View From The Bench; 34 GA. L. REV. 1049 
(2007); Another Brick In The Wall: An Empirical Look At Georgia Tort Litigation In The 
1990s, 41 GA. L. REV. 431 (2000); and A Profile Of Tort Litigation In Georgia And 
Reflections On Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627 (1996). In 2005, Professor Eaton 
became the first law professor at the University of Georgia to be awarded a Creative 
Research Medal for his collaborative empirical studies of the civil justice system. 
Professor Eaton’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.law.uga.edu/academics/profiles/eaton.html 
THEODORE EISENBERG is the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law at Cornell 
Law School. He graduated from Swarthmore College in 1969 and from the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School in 1972. He clerked for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, and for Chief Justice Earl Warren (ret.). Before entering teaching, he practiced 
law in New York with Debevoise & Plimpton. He began his teaching career at UCLA 
Law School and has been a Professor at Cornell Law School since 1981. He has been a 
Visiting Professor at Harvard, Stanford, and NYU Law Schools. He is founder and co-
editor of the Journal of Empirical Studies, a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, and a 
member of the Law and Society Association, the American Bar Association, and the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. He serves on the editorial board of the 
American Law and Economics Review and has served on the Board of Directors of the 
American Law and Economics Association. He has been a National Science Foundation 
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and American Bar Foundation grantee. He is Editor-in-Chief of a multi-volume treatise 
on DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW and is the author of BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR 
LAW (3d ed. 2004) and CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (5th ed. 2004). Professor Eisenberg’s 
empirical studies of the legal system have appeared in many law reviews, and cover the 
death penalty, civil rights, torts, judge and jury trials, bankruptcy, and litigation models. 
He has served as a referee for the following: journals and organizations: Am. Econ. Rev., 
NSF, Law & Soc’y Rev., Justice System J., Rev. of Econ. & Statistics, Econ. Inquiry, 
Oxford Univ. Press, Harvard Univ. Press, Cornell Univ. Press, Yale Univ. Press, Alfred 
P. Sloan Found’n; Social Science & Medicine; J. Legal Studies, Internat’l Rev. Law & 
Econ., The Rockefeller Found’n, Social Sciences & Humanities Research Council of 
Canada, J. Law & Econ., Smith Richardson Found’n, Univ. of Chicago Press, 
NeuroToxicology, RAND Institute for Civil Justice; Louisiana Board of Regents; 
Harvard Law Review; Harvard School of Public Health; Law & Social Inquiry; American 
Political Science Review. Among his published articles are: Overlooked in the Tort 
Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 551 
(2005); Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741 (2004); 
Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Non-Tried Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 659 (2004); Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119-154 (2002); Trial 
Outcomes and Demographics: Is There A Bronx Effect?, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1839-75 
(2002); Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
743 (2002); Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing Awards in 
Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129 (2001); Empirical Methods and 
the Law, 95 J. AMERICAN STAT. ASS’N 665 (2000); Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
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Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 581-607 (1998); The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 
28 RAND J. OF ECONOMICS S92 (1997); Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products 
Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992); Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992); The Quiet Revolution in Products 
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990). 
Professor Eisenberg’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/faculty_cvs/Eisenberg.pdf 
NEAL R. FEIGENSON is Professor of Law at Quinnipiac University School of Law 
in Hamden, CT, and has been Visiting Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and the 
University of Connecticut Law School. He studies the cognitive and social psychology of 
jury decision making and the role of visual communication and persuasion in law. He is 
the author of LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
(American Psychological Association Books, 2000), and has authored or co-authored 
more than two dozen articles and book chapters, including in leading journals such as 
Law and Human Behavior; Psychology, Public Policy, and Law; and Law, Probability, 
and Risk. Among his published articles are: Merciful Damages: Some Remarks about 
Forgiveness, Mercy, and Tort Law, 27 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 1633 (2000); Accidents as 
Melodrama, 43 N.Y. L. REV. 741 (2000); Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A 
Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); The Effect of Blameworthiness and 
Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative 
Negligence Cases, 21 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 597 (1997). 
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LUCINDA M. FINLEY is Vice Provost for Faculty Affairs and Frank G. Raichle 
Professor of Trial and Appellate Advocacy, University at Buffalo Law School, The State 
University of New York. A graduate of Columbia University School of Law, she is the 
former Chair of the Torts Section of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), 
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throughout the U.S. An active participant in litigation and legislative advocacy, she has 
argued several cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals and is 
the author of numerous amicus curiae briefs, including a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court 
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has presented legislative testimony before U.S. Senate and House of Representative 
committees, the New York State and Connecticut legislatures, and an Ohio legislative 
commission. Prior to joining the University of Buffalo, she was associate professor of 
law at Yale University. Her teaching and research subjects include Torts, Toxic Torts, 
Women and the Law, and Feminist Jurisprudence. She has published more than 20 law 
review articles and book chapters and has lectured about legal topics in the U.S., Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Her most important articles, for the 
purposes of the instant case, are The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, 
and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L. J. 1263 (2004); Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal 
Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century Women’s Rights Activists’ 
Understandings of Equality, 13 TEMPLE POLITICAL & RIGHTS L. REV. 429 (2004); and 
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Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L. REV. 847 
(1997). She also is the author of The Priceless-Worthless Dilemma: In Defense of 
Individualized Non-Economic Damages in CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (D. 
Engel and M. McCann, editors) (Stanford Univ. Press, forthcoming). 
Professor Finley’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.law.buffalo.edu/Faculty_And_Staff/submenu/ScholarPages/Finley.pdf 
MARC GALANTER is John and Rylla Bosshard Professor Emeritus of Law and 
South Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and LSE Centennial 
Professor at the London School of Economics. He received degrees in philosophy and 
law from the University of Chicago. In addition to the University of Wisconsin and the 
London School of Economics, he has taught at Chicago, Buffalo, Columbia and Stanford. 
From 1990 to 1998, he was Director of Wisconsin’s Institute for Legal Studies, one of the 
leading centers for empirical study of the legal system. He is the author of five books and 
over one hundred articles on litigation, lawyers and legal culture, including articles on 
jury trials and on punitive damages. He has been editor of the Law & Society Review, 
President of the Law and Society Association, Chair of the International Commission on 
Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, a member of the Council on the Role of Courts, a 
Guggenheim Fellow, and a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral 
Sciences. He is a member of the American Law Institute and a Fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among his most relevant articles are: Reading the 
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About 
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); The Day 
After The Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); News from Nowhere: The 
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Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENVER U. L. REV. 77 (1993); Predators and 
Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L REV. 633 (1994); Real World 
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); An Oil Strike in Hell: 
Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); The 
Conniving Claimant: Changing Images of Misuse of Legal Remedies, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
647 (2000); The Turn Against Law: the Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 
TEXAS L. REV. 285 (2002); The Three-Legged Pig: Risk Redistribution and 
Antinomianism in American Legal Culture, 22 MISSISSIPPI COLL. L. REV. 47(2002); The 
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 459 (2004). 
Professor Galanter’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://www.marcgalanter.net/cv.htm 
VALERIE P. HANS is Professor of Law at Cornell Law School. She holds a Ph.D. 
in Social Psychology from the University of Toronto. She conducts empirical studies of 
law. Professor Hans has carried out extensive research, lectured, and written widely about 
the American jury system and other social science and the law topics, including six books 
and one hundred research publications. Her books on the jury include BUSINESS ON 
TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000); THE JURY SYSTEM: 
CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP (2006); AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007, with 
Duke Law Professor and fellow amicus Neil Vidmar) and JUDGING THE JURY (1986, with 
Duke Law Professor and fellow amicus with Neil Vidmar). She has served on the 
National Science Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Advisory Panel, and regularly 
functions as an external reviewer for National Science Foundation grant proposals. She 
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has served on the editorial boards of Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Journal of 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, Law and Human Behavior, Law and Policy, Law & 
Society Review, and Psychology, Crime, and Law. Among her published articles are: 
Empirical Research And Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497 (2003); 
Whiplash: Who’s To Blame? (Symposium: Responsibility And Blame: Psychological And 
Legal Perspectives), 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1093 (2003); Avoid Bald Men And People With 
Green Socks? Other Ways To Improve The Voir Dire Process In Jury Selection 
(Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience III—the Jury in 
Practice), 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179 (2003); Nullification At Work? A Glimpse From 
The National Center For State Courts Study Of Hung Juries (Symposium: The Jury at a 
Crossroad: The American Experience III—the Jury in Practice), 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1249 (2003); U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury And The Adversarial Ideal—The Jury’s 
Role in Administering Justice in the United States, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85 
(2002); The Illusions And Realities Of Jurors’ Treatment Of Corporate Defendants 
(Symposium: The American Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality), 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327 
(1998). 
 Professor Hans’ complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/faculty_cvs/Hans.pdf 
MICHAEL HEISE is Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, where he specializes 
in empirical legal scholarship and bridging empirical methodologies, legal theory, and 
policy analysis. He writes in public and private law areas, including civil justice reform, 
punitive damages, education policy, criminal sentencing, and judicial decision-making. 
Professor Heise’s teaching areas include torts, empirical methods for lawyers, insurance 
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law, constitutional law, business torts, education law, and law and social science. 
Professor Heise has received numerous awards for his scholarship and teaching, 
including the Law & Society Association’s Best Article Prize in 1999. Professor Heise 
has co-edited the since 2005. He earned an A.B. from Stanford University, a J.D. from 
the University of Chicago, and a Ph.D. from Northwestern University, and was admitted 
to the Illinois Bar in 1987. He is the author of 50 law review articles, peer-reviewed 
articles, book chapters, and other scholarly publications, including: Essays Plaintiphobia 
in State Courts? An Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES ___ (forthcoming 2009)(with Cornell Prof. Theodore Eisenberg); Punitive 
Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992, 1996, 
and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 263 (2006) (with Cornell Professor 
Theodore Eisenberg, et al.); Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About 
Statistical Measures, 99 NW. L. REV. 745 (2005); Litigated Learning and the Limits of 
Law, 57 VANDERBILT L. REV. 2417 (2004); The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical 
and Experimental Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision-making as a Case Study, 2002 
UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002); The Future of Civil Justice Reform and Empirical 
Legal Scholarship: A Reply, 51 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 251 (2000); The Importance 
of Being Empirical, 26 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 807 (1999). 
Professor Heise’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://ww3.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/faculty_cvs/Heise.pdf. 
EDWARD J. KIONKA is Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Georgia 
School of Law where he leads courses in the areas of torts and federal courts. For 30 
years, Kionka taught law at Southern Illinois University where he was a member of the 
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founding faculty and served as associate dean during 1984-85. Kionka has been a visiting 
professor at law schools across the country including Washington University in St. Louis, 
Emory University, the University of San Diego and Saint Louis University. Before his 
tenure at Southern Illinois, he served as assistant dean and assistant professor at the 
University of Illinois College of Law and as executive director of the Illinois Institute for 
Continuing Legal Education. He was also an associate at Leibman, Williams, Bennett, 
Baird and Minow in Chicago. Professor Kionka is the co-author of EVIDENCE: TEACHING 
MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES and the author of TORTS IN A 
NUTSHELL and TORTS BLACK LETTER. He has also written numerous articles appearing in 
journals such as the Louisiana Law Review and the Illinois Bar Journal. Most pertinent 
among his published articles is: Things To Do (Or Not) To Address The Medical 
Malpractice Insurance Problem, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469 (2006). 
 Professor Kionka’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.kionkalaw.com/ted-kionka.html 
 THOMAS H. KOENIG is a Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at 
Northeastern University and a founding core faculty member of Northeastern’s Law, 
Policy and Society Ph.D. program. He is the lead author of IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 
(NYU Press, 2001). His empirical studies on American tort law have been published in 
leading academic journals such as American Behavioral Scientist, American University 
Law Review, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Justice System Journal, Law & Policy, 
Rutgers Law Review, Washington Law Review and Wisconsin Law Review. Among his 
published articles is: Taming The Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice System As A 
Battleground Of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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Professor Koenig’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at http://www. 
socant.neu.edu/faculty/koenig/documents/Thomas_Koenig_Vita_September_2007.pdf 
HERBERT M. KRITZER is Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, 
Saint Paul, Minnesota, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, 
and Professor of Political Science and Law Emeritus, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
He has conducted extensive empirical research on the American civil justice system, as 
well as research on other common law systems. His most recent book is RISKS, 
REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Stanford Univ. Press, 2004). He is the author, coauthor, or editor of six other 
books and has published over 100 articles in professional journals. Over the last 20 years, 
he has conducted research on the American civil justice system dealing with contingency 
fee legal practice, the impact of Rule 11 sanctions, alternative forms of advocacy and 
representation, and the adult guardianship process in Wisconsin. Research with a cross-
national element has included writing on the English Rule, propensity to sue, the 
frequency of criminal and civil trials in England, and politics in the English judicial 
system. His current research includes changing patterns in judicial elections (a first article 
appeared in DePaul Law Review), insurance defense legal practice (recently published in 
Vanderbilt Law Review), and the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (recently published 
in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies), and a study of local television news coverage 
of the courts and the legal profession. Professor Kritzer recently completed a term as 
editor of Law & Society Review, the leading journal in interdisciplinary legal studies. In 
July 2007, Professor Kritzer joined the faculty of the William Mitchell College of Law 
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after having taught for 30 years at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Among his 
published articles are: Advocacy And Rhetoric vs. Scholarship And Evidence In The 
Debate Over Contingency Fees: A Reply To Professor Brickman, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 477 
(2004); Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739 
(2002); Lawyer Fees And Lawyer Behavior In Litigation: What Does The Empirical 
Literature Really Say? (Symposium: What We Know and Do Not Know About the Impact 
of Civil Justice on the American Economy and Polity), 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943 (2002); The 
Wages Of Risk: The Returns Of Contingency Fee Legal Practice (Symposium: 
Contingency Fee Financing Of Litigation In America Third Annual Clifford Seminar On 
Tort Law And Social Policy), 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998); Data, Data, Data, 
“Drowning In Data”: Crafting The Hollow Core, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 761 (1996).  
Professor Kritzer’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.wmitchell.edu/academics/faculty/kritzer.asp 
DAVID I. LEVINE is Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College 
of the Law. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Michigan in psychology and 
history, Professor Levine also studied at University College, University of London on the 
London Exchange Fellowship, researching in the area of developmental psychology. He 
went on to graduate from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where he was an 
editor of the law review and a legal writing instructor. Before joining the Hastings faculty 
in 1982, Professor Levine lived in New Orleans while serving as a law clerk to Judge 
Alvin B. Rubin of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and was also 
an associate in the litigation department of Morrison and Foerster in San Francisco. He 
served as Associate Academic Dean from 1989-1991. He is co-author or co-editor of six 
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books, including REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AND CALIFORNIA CIVIL PROCEDURE, as 
well as the author of articles on civil procedure, torts and institutional reform litigation. 
He has served as the Reporter for the District of Nevada’s Committee on the 
Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act and as a research analyst for the Northern 
District of California’s Early Neutral Evaluation Program. He is a member of the 
American Law Institute and the Law and Society Association. He has been a peer 
reviewer for Law and Policy. 
Professor Levine’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://w3.uchastings.edu/levine/bio.htm 
NANCY S. MARDER is a Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law. She is 
a graduate of Yale College, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School, where she was 
an Articles Editor of the Yale Law Journal. Professor Marder has clerked at every level of 
the United States federal court system, including a two-year clerkship with Justice John 
Paul Stevens at the U.S. Supreme Court, and one-year clerkships with Judge William A. 
Norris at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and Judge Leonard B. Sand in 
the Southern District of New York. Professor Marder has written numerous articles on 
the jury; they have appeared in law reviews such as Northwestern University Law 
Review, Texas Law Review, Iowa Law Review, and Southern California Law Review. 
She has written a book on the jury entitled THE JURY PROCESS (2005). Her work on the 
jury has covered a wide range of issues from the jury and the medical malpractice debate 
to the proper roles of peremptory challenges, jury instructions, and jury nullification. She 
has presented her work on the jury at many conferences and symposia in this country and 
abroad and regularly teaches a law school course on the jury entitled “Juries, Judges & 
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Trials.” Among her published articles are: The Medical Malpractice Debate: The Jury As 
Scapegoat (Symposium Access to Justice: Can Business Coexist with the Civil Justice 
System?), 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1267 (2005); The Myth Of The Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. 
U. L. REV. 877 (1999); Juries And Damages: A Commentary (Symposium: The American 
Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality), 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 427 (1998). 
Professor Marder’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/faculty/nmarder/ 
JOANNE MARTIN is a Senior Research Fellow at the American Bar Foundation in 
Chicago, IL. She holds a J.D. for Loyola University of Chicago and an M.M. from 
Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management. Her research focuses on law 
and public policy and the various aspects of the American civil justice system. She has 
written on trial courts, juries, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and the politics of civil justice reform – 
including the areas of medical malpractice, products liability, and punitive damages. She 
is co-author (with fellow amicus Stephen Daniels) of CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF 
REFORM (Northwestern University Press, 1995), and author or co-author of 36 articles in 
law reviews (e.g., Texas Law Review, Minnesota Law Review, Wisconsin Law Review) 
and social science journals (e.g., Law & Policy, Justice System Journal) focusing on law 
and public policy, as well as 27 ABA Survey Reports for the American Bar Association. 
She reviews research proposals for the National Science Foundation and is a current 
member of the editorial board for Law & Social Inquiry, a peer-reviewed journal. Among 
her published articles are: Alive and Well (Maybe) in Texas: Plaintiffs’ Practice in the 
Age of Tort Reform, 51 N.Y. L. REV. 286 (2007); Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, Specialization, and 
Medical Malpractice, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1051 (2006); The Texas Two-Step: 
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Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635(2006); 
The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L. J. 1225 (2004); It Was the Best of 
Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs’ Practice in Texas, 
80 TEXAS L. REV. 1781 (2002); The Impact That It Has Had is Between People’s Ears: 
Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000); 
Access Denied: The Subtle Effects of Tort Reform, TRIAL, 263 (July 1997); Persistence Is 
Not Always a Virtue: Tort Reform, Civil Liability for Health Care, and the Lack of 
Empirical Evidence, 15 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 3 (1997); Are Jury Awards 
Increasing? 26 JUDGES’ J. 10 (1987); Jury Verdicts and the “Crisis” in Civil Justice: 
Some Findings from an Empirical Study, 11 JUSTICE SYSTEM J. 321 (1986). 
Professor Martin’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/faculty/profile/16. 
 FRANK M. MCCLELLAN is the I. Herman Stern Professor of Law at Temple 
University, Beasley School of Law, where he has taught since 1981 and where he teaches 
Torts, Bioethics, Medical Malpractice, and Drug Product Liability. He also lectures at 
Temple University School of Medicine on various topics related to law, medicine and 
ethics and at American Law Institute-American Bar Association (“ALI-ABA”) 
conferences, currently serving as the Co-Chair and Planner of the ALI-ABA course 
medical malpractice course. In 1995, Temple University awarded him the Friel-Scanlon 
Prize for outstanding scholarship. Professor McClellan has written numerous law review 
articles on medical malpractice, bioethics and tort law. Professor McClellan earned his 
B.A. from Rutgers University (1967), his J.D. from Duquesne University (1970), and his 
LL.M. degree from Yale University (1974). At Duquesne, he was a member of the law 
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review and received a merit award for academic excellence. At Yale, he was awarded the 
Felix S. Cohen Prize in Jurisprudence. From 1970-71 he served as a law clerk for the late 
Honorable William H. Hastie, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. He then practiced as an associate with the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering before joining the law faculty of Duquesne University, where he 
taught from 1972 through 1981. Professor McClellan devotes much of his public service 
time to projects aimed toward eliminating racial and other group-based biases in higher 
education and in the justice system. In 2002-2003 he served a the Chair of a Workgroup 
that spent two years exploring perceptions of racial bias in the court system of attorneys, 
litigants and judges throughout the state of Pennsylvania, as a part of an overall study of 
bias in the justice system conducted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on 
Racial and Gender Bias. He is the author of MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS AND 
ETHICS (Temple Univ. Press 1994), co-author of TORTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS (3rd ed. 2002), and author of 30 scholarly articles, including: The Nature and 
Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2007); Medical 
Malpractice Law, Morality and the Culture Wars: A Critical Assessment of the Tort 
Reform Movement, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 33 (2006); Litigating Medical Malpractice Claims: 
Developments in the Law, in LITIGATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (ALI-ABA 
2001, updates 2002, 2004, 2005) (with E. Ihuekwumere); Tort Law and the Pharmacist, 
in LITIGATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (ALI-ABA 2001, update 2002, 2004, 
2005) (with L. Fierro); Tort Liability of Physicians, Hospitals, and Other Health Care 
Providers, in LITIGATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (ALI-ABA 2001, updates 
2002, 2004, 2005); Tort Reform for Medical Malpractice Cases: Stories v. Statistics, 3 L. 
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& BIOETHICS REP. 7 (2003); Bendectin Revisited: Is There a Right to a Jury Trial in an 
Age of Judicial Gatekeeping?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 261 (1998); Confronting Racial, 
Ethnic, or Gender Bias in Product Liability Cases, in LITIGATING MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (ALI-ABA 1997); Recent Decisions on Institutional and 
Practitioner Liability, in LITIGATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (ALI-ABA 1997); 
Symposium, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 761 (1996).  
 Professor McClellan’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.law.temple.edu/servlet/RetrievePage?site=TempleLaw&page=Faculty_McCl
ellan. 
 DEBORAH JONES MERRITT is John Deaver Drinko-Baker & Hostetler Chair in 
Law; Courtesy Professor of Sociology; Courtesy Professor of Public Policy and 
Management; and Associate Faculty Member in Women’s Studies, all at the Ohio State 
University. Professor Merritt graduated from Harvard College summa cum laude in 1977 
and from Columbia Law School in 1980. While at Columbia, she was Managing Editor 
of the Columbia Law Review and won the Robert Noxon Toppan Prize. After graduation, 
Professor Merritt clerked for Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Professor Merritt practiced law in Atlanta, 
Georgia, and joined the law faculty at the University of Illinois in 1985. She served there 
as Professor of Law, Professor of Women’s Studies, Advisor to the Joint JD/MD 
Program, and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs before moving to Ohio State, where 
she accepted the Drinko Chair in 1995. Professor Merritt has been honored as both an 
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Ohio State University Distinguished Lecturer (1999) and as a University Distinguished 
Scholar (2002), awards conferred on the University’s most outstanding researchers. In 
2004, the University recognized her work promoting diversity with one of its 
Distinguished Diversity Enhancement Awards. She also served as the University’s 
general commencement speaker for the Autumn 2004 commencement. From 2000-2005, 
Merritt directed the John Glenn Institute, a University-wide institute devoted to 
encouraging public service and informing public policy. Much of her work has focused 
on public policy issues, and she has made numerous presentations to judges, legislators, 
and other policymakers. She has also co-taught courses in Europe with both Justice 
Ginsburg and Justice O’Connor. Professor Merritt teaches Evidence, Law and 
Psychology, Law and Social Science, and Women and Law has published widely on 
issues of equality, affirmative action, federalism, health and technology, legal education, 
tort reform, and law and social science. She is the author of more than 100 scholarly 
articles, essays, papers, and presentations, including: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: The 
Framers’ “First Woman,” 31 J. OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY 107 (2006) (invited 
contribution to tribute issue honoring Justice O’Connor); Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 
Jurisprudence of Opportunity and Equality, 104 COLUMBIA L. REV. 39 (2004) (invited 
contribution to Symposium Honoring Justice Ginsburg’s Tenth Anniversary on the 
Supreme Court) (with David Lieberman); Constructing Identity in Law and Social 
Science, 11 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 731 (2001); Constitutional Fact and Theory: A 
Reply to Chief Judge Posner, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1287 (1999); Affirmative Action: An 
International Human Rights Dialogue, 54 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 278 (May/June 1999) (with Ruth Bader Ginsburg; excerpted in 
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BROOKINGS REVIEW (Winter 2000); Is the Tort System in Crisis? New Empirical 
Evidence, 60 OHIO STATE L. J. 315 (1999) (with Kathryn Barry). 
 Professor Merritt’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/cv/merritt_deborah.pdf. 
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR. is the Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law at the University 
of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, where he has also served as the Associate Dean for 
Faculty Research. His specialty is health law. Before coming to MU, he practiced law in 
Louisville, Kentucky defending product liability and medical malpractice lawsuits. After 
moving to Missouri, he was the malpractice consultant for Governor Mel Carnahan’s 
Health Reform Commission. He has written extensively on health law, focusing most 
recently on medical malpractice law. He work has been published by Oxford University 
Press, Michigan Law Review, Northwestern Law Review, UCLA Law Review, 
Regulation, the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, and many other legal and medical 
journals. He has been asked to serve as an external reviewer by Oxford University Press, 
JAMA and Health Affairs, has served for many years as an elected member of the 
American Law Institute, and is a Life Fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. He 
speaks often before both medical and legal audiences. In the community, he is the past 
President of the Board of Directors of the Family Health Center, a community health 
center whose doors are open to everyone regardless of ability to pay. Professor Peters 
received his undergraduate degree in economics from Harvard University and his JD 
from the University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Among his published articles 
are: Cultures of Claiming: Local Variation in Malpractice Claim Frequency, 5 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 77 (2008); Health Courts?, 88 BOSTON U. L. REV. 227 
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(2008); Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 143 (2007); What We Know About 
Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783 (2007). 
Professor Peters’ complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://law.missouri.edu/faculty/petersp.html 
JAMES T. RICHARDSON is Foundation Professor of Sociology and Judicial 
Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno, where he directs the graduate Judicial Studies 
degree program for trial judges, offered in conjunction with the National Judicial College 
and the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. He teaches a seminar, 
“Social and Behavioral Sciences and the Law” in the program. He has a Ph.D. in 
Sociology from Washington State University, as well as a J.D. from Old College, Nevada 
School of Law. He has done research on the legal system, including research on jury 
behavior. He has published work in Law and Human Behavior, Behavioral Sciences and 
Law, Brigham Young University Law Review, University of Queensland Law review, 
University of New South Wales Law Journal, The Justice System Journal, Judicature, and 
other books and journals in the social sciences. He reviews for a number of journals in 
the social sciences and in law related fields. 
Professor Richardson’s complete biographical profile can be viewed at 
http://www.unr.edu/cla/soc/jtr.htm 
CHARLES SILVER holds the Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in 
Civil Procedure and is Co-Director of the Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice, and the 
Media at the University of Texas School of Law. He obtained an M.A. in Political 
Science at the University of Chicago in 1982, served as the Managing Editor of Ethics 
from 1982-1984, graduated from the Yale Law School in 1987, and joined the Texas 
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faculty that year. He has published widely on class actions and complex lawsuits, 
attorneys’ fees, the professional responsibilities of lawyers, insurance, and health care 
law and policy. Professor Silver currently serves as Associate Reporter on the American 
Law Institute’s project on aggregate litigation. Additionally, Professor Silver co-authored 
a series of empirical studies of insured tort litigation in Texas, including medical 
malpractice litigation. Among his published articles are: Physician’s Insurance Limits 
and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LEGAL 
STUDIES S9 (2007); Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, 
Stupid, 59 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1085 (2006); Medical Malpractice Reform REDUX: 
Déjà Vu All Over Again?, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 121 (2005); The Poor State of Health 
Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the 
Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. (2005); Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim 
Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 207 (2005); Speak Not 
of Error: Does Legal Fear Increase the Risk of Medical Error?, REGULATION 52 (Spring 
2005); Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much? (Symposium: The Impact of Civil Justice on 
the American Economy & Polity), 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073 (2002). 
 Professor Silver’s complete Curriculum Vita can be viewed at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/cvs/csilver_cv.pdf  
RICHARD W. WRIGHT is a Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of 
Technology’s Chicago-Kent College of Law. He is an elected member of the American 
Law Institute, past chair of the Torts and Compensation Systems Section of the 
Association of American Law Schools, and a member of the Advisory Boards of the 
Torts, Product Liability and Insurance Law Journal of the Social Science Research 
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Network, the Journal of Tort Law, and the Center for Justice and Democracy. He has 
been a visiting professor or fellow at the University of Texas in Austin, the University of 
Canterbury in New Zealand, Brasenose College and the University of Oxford in England, 
the University of Melbourne in Australia, and the Universidad Torcuato di Tella in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. His published work appears in several international collections 
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GRAPH No. 2: Rate of All Licensed Physicians per 100,000 People—Illinois 
vs. the Nine Bordering and Neighboring States with "Caps" and theTwo 
Non-Neighboring States with Caps Extolled by the Lebron v. Levi-
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